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ARTICLE
Policing Terrorists in the Community
Sahar F. Aziz*
Abstract
Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic
terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using
a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to stop
terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing,
developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities,
is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and
local police to combat "Islamist homegrown terrorism." Developed in
response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon
the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships
among local law enforcement and the communities they serve.
While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this
Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril, both for collective
civil liberties and the interests of local police in preserving relationships of
trust. Accordingly, this Article examines how community policing
exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying post-9/11 subordination of
Muslims arising from preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding
the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The
Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism:
(1) it is more akin to counter-radicalization taken from military
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counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based, traditional
community policing model; (2) to the collective detriment of Muslim
communities, it divides them into "Good Muslims" willing to cooperate
with law enforcement on the federal government's terms and "Bad
Muslims" who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of
Muslim communities' civil rights and liberties; and (3) it deputizes Muslim
leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their
communities that may be used against their collective interests as part of the
predominantly federal prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime.
Unless systemic reforms are made to federal preventive counterterrorism
strategies, community policing is likely to aggravate existing civil liberties
violations and impair otherwise good relations between Muslim
communities and local police. Thus, a serious rethinking of proposals to
implement community policing in counterterrorism is warranted.
I. Introduction
Over the past few years, federal government officials have
expressed concerns over an increasing "Islamist homegrown terrorist"
threat. 2 High-profile cases involving "lone wolves" accused of terrorist
plots on U.S. soil, coupled with public perceptions of Muslims as prone to
terrorism, have triggered a flurry of Congressional hearings and executive
reports recommending harsher counterterrorism enforcement focused on
Muslim communities. Meanwhile, critics of "hard" counterterrorism tactics
propose increasing community outreach to Muslim communities, through
community policing in particular, as the solution to homegrown terrorism.3
As a consequence, community policing has become popular both among
policy makers seeking to be more preventive in counterterrorism and
I See HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-19-29 (2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (describing counterinsurgency
efforts to integrate culturally sensitive activities designed to ensure the security and welfare
of the nation's populace to win their favor with typical military activities to defeat the
enemy).
2 See Matthew C. Waxman, Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement
and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 377, 382-83 (2009).
See, e.g., Mohamed Elibiary, Boston Bombings and the Radicalized Homegrown
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Muslim community leaders concerned with protecting the civil liberties of
their constituents.
By challenging the underlying presumptions of those calling for
community policing in counterterrorism, this Article argues that adversarial,
federal counterterrorism enforcement cannot be reconciled with the
partnership-based local community policing model .5 Community policing
in counterterrorism as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of
empowerment and mutual trust, and serves as another weapon in the federal
government's toolkit that perpetuates the "Terrorist Other" stereotype. 6
Until this stereotype can be stripped away from "hard on terror" preventive
counterterrorism strategies, the benefits gained in the traditional local
community policing model of the 1990s are unlikely to be realized.
4 See, e.g., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
(CVE) WORKING GROUP 5 (2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
hsac cve workinggrouprecommendations.pdf, [http://penna.cc/06SULsqs3j6]; EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES
16 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf,
[http://penna.cc/OZGrrHAbzDt/] [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL
PARTNERS]; Eileen Sullivan, Community Outreach Key to Obama Counterterror Plan,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/community-outreach-key-
obama-counterterror-plan, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OxivLXCA9Cx/]; Michael Hirsch,
Stopping Terrorism at the Source, NAT'L J., May 2, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/
magazine/stopping-terrorism-at-the-source-20 1 30502?print= true, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OkdXA3qXdTW] (discussing that some Muslim community leaders
are willing to work with the Obama Administration's strategy but are growing impatient
with delays likely due to funding issues and the lack of organization and leadership).
5 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (defining interest convergence theory); David
A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant
Communities After 9/11, 34 N.YU. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 123, 162 (2010); Sudha Setty,
National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 185 (2012); MICHAEL
PRICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL POLICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 (Dec. 2013),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/national-security-local-police,
[http://perna.cc/5CMN-MK7L].
6 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575 (2002);
Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 436
(2011); Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 229 (2005); Madalla A. Alibeli & Abdulfattah Yaghi, Theories of Prejudice
andAttitudes Toward Muslims in the United States, 2 INT'L J. OF HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI.
1 (2012) (discussing the scapegoating of American Muslims).
7 John Murray, Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in
Priorities?, 6 POLICE PRAC. &RES. 347, 348 (2005).
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Put simply, community policing co-opts Muslim community leaders
into gathering and sharing intelligence on Muslims' political beliefs,
religious practices, and other information otherwise unavailable to law
enforcement due to constitutional constraints.8 Believing they are serving
the best interests of Muslim communities, 9 many unwitting participants
disclose the goings-on of the community and provide information about the
politics of community leaders and mosques. This enables law enforcement's
investigative arm to reach deeper into Muslim communities' affairs than
they could otherwise, resulting in a de facto deputizing effect.10 All the
while, aggressive counterterrorism enforcement practices and policies
focused exclusively on Muslims remain unchanged."
In contrast to traditional community policing where citizens seek
the protection of local law enforcement from third-party drug dealers,
gangsters, and other criminal elements, Muslim communities engage with
federal law enforcement to dissuade them from spying on their mosques and
social gatherings, 12  targeting their vulnerable youth in informant-led
terrorist plots,13 prosecuting their charities for giving humanitarian aid to
S See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 161; Will McCants & Clint Watts, U.S. Strategy for
Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment, FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST. 5 (Dec. 2012),
available at https://www.fpri.org/docs/McCantsWatts_-_CounteringViolent
Extremism.pdf, lwww.pena.cc/OdH6R7mqXaU] (highlighting contradiction in White
House's Countering Violent Extremism Strategy that aims to avoid securitization of
Muslims but which, by focusing exclusively on Muslims, still sends the message "You
Muslims are a potential threat and we, the government, have to co-opt you"); Waxman,
supra note 2, at 401-02.
9 See Ryan Hunter & Danielle Heinke, Radicalization oflslamist Terrorists in the Western
World, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 27-29 (Sept. 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-20 11/perspective, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/OWBpj4S4xsv/] (finding voluntary cooperation by Muslim
Americans in anti-terror policing more likely when authorities are viewed as more
legitimate).
10 See Harris, supra note 5, at 127.
" See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ESTABLISHING A NEW NORMAL: NATIONAL
SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
(2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/EstablishingNewNonal.pdf.
12 See Harris, supra note 5, passim for a discussion of the harm to community relations that
the use of informants can cause, and the suggested use of a negotiated agreement between
community members and the FBI regarding its use of informants in the community.
13 See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 645, 645-46 (2004), for a discussion of the community harms that informant
use can create. See generally CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.YU. SCH. OF L., TEN YEARS LATER:
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 -SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 26 (2011)
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conflict zones,14 and adopting invidious counterterrorism tactics that destroy
community bonds." And as they beseech their government to respect their
civil liberties, Muslims must also seek the protection of law enforcement
against private acts of violence and discrimination. 16 For many Muslims,
the government may come across as more a foe than a friend.17
Thus, counterterrorism community policing ("CCP") is not, nor is it
intended to be, the same as community policing in the traditional criminal
context.18 Rather than fundamentally changing relations between law
enforcement and communities into a partnership, CCP perpetuates
preventive counterterrorism strategies that prioritize the surveillance,
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Muslims. 19
available at http://www.1awandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%/ 20Ten%/ 2OYear
%20Issue.pdf.
14 See David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt byAssociation and the Paradigm of Prevention
in the 'War on Terror,' in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY'S CHALLENGE 233 (Bianchi
& Keller eds., 2008).
15 See Murad Hussain, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in
Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 939 (2008);
see Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of
Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2002).
16 See Ashar, supra note 15, at 1196; see also Marc Santora, Woman is Charged with
Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal Subway Push, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/nyregion/woman-is-held-in-death-of-man-pushed-onto-
subway-tracks-in-queens.html?_r=0, [http://perma.law. harvard.edu/Otz7gs5Zyo9/]
(describing woman who pushed man on tracks, where he was fatally crushed by an
oncoming train, because he "looked Muslim or Hindu" and the woman "hate[d] Muslim
and Hindus ever since 2001").
17 See ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO
PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (Aug. 2011), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empoweringlocalpartners.pdf, [www.penna.cc/
06PpqkunXzn] [hereinafter EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS]; STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 4, at 20; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., PREVENTING
VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA 28 (June 2011), available at http://
bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf; Vera Chinese & Simone Weichselbaum,
Man Stabbed Outside Queens Mosque, Attacker Screamed Anti-Muslim Rant, Say Cops,
N.Y DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/man-stabbed-
queens-mosque-article-1.1204122, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/05GBluwT64X]; Nigel
Duara, Ore. Muslim Sues FBI, Claims Torture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 30, 2013, http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-ore-muslim-sues-fbi-claims-torture, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/OHbGqRBK5vD/] (describing one man's beatings and
interrogations while held captive overseas, allegedly at the command of the FBI).
18 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5 at 133-34.
19 See, e.g., Ten Years after 9/11-Are We Safer?: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Aff., 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
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As a result, Muslims have little choice but to engage with the same
entities that both violate their civil liberties and legitimize civil rights
violations by private actors. 20 Indeed, for many Muslim proponents of the
practice, community policing offers a formal mechanism to reform
counterterrorism practices that adversely impact Muslim communities. This
Article examines how community policing exacerbates, rather than
resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims manifested in racialized
counterterrorism policies, 21  notwithstanding the increase of homegrown
terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. 22
Proponents of community policing between law enforcement and
Muslim communities erroneously presume a convergence of interests
between the two. Moreover, they shortsightedly focus on local policing
when in practice, federal law enforcement agencies drive counterterrorism
enforcement. 23 I challenge the underlying assumption that the interests of
law enforcement and Muslim communities converge. Indeed, community
03TwhZGoQoz/] [hereinafter Ten Years After 911 Hearings] (statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, FBI) ("To meet the growing demand for surveillance, the Bureau has
increased the number of unarmed surveillance teams by 127 percent since 2001."); MARC
LYNCH, RHETORIC AND REALITY: COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 14
(June 2010), available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
CNAS Rhetoric%20and%2ORealityLynch.pdf; JUDE MCCULLOCH, BLUE ARMY:
PARAMILITARY POLICING IN VICTORIA 31 (2001); PRICE, supra note 5, at 7 (noting the
post-9/11 change towards "intelligence-led policing").
20 See EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17, and STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 4, which detail the Obama Administration's
community engagement plan. See also Hussain, supra note 15, at 934; Ashar, supra note
15, at 1196.
21 See Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to
Islamophobia, 21 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 139-45 (2012) (discussing
racial element of immigration laws and Patriot Act); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS
SAFE, LESS FREE 102-28 (2007) (providing additional examples of policies proven
ineffective in promoting national security while also reinforcing racial bias).
22 See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 7 (reporting that of the 1,054 total terror-
related cases prosecuted since 9/11, 578 involved Muslims and 476 did not involve
Muslims or Islam); SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., Terror from the Right: Plots,
Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City (2012), available at http://
www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror from the
right 2012 web_0.pdf (detailing the nearly 100 plots, conspiracies, and racist acts of
radical right groups and individuals since 1995).
23 See Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://
www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OVKpnydYTtU/] (describing the Department of Homeland Security's primary goal to
prevent terrorist acts); Joint Terrorism Task Force, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/jttf/, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/OmjActZyfW7/] (noting that the
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policing is merely an extension of the federal government's prosecutorial
approach that prioritizes law enforcement's interests in expanding the
number of anti-terrorism investigations and prosecutions 24 at the expense of
key collective rights of American Muslim communities and community
alliances that are essential to defeat genuine terrorism threats. These
collective liberties include the rights to be free from surveillance, to practice
their religion without undue scrutiny by the state, to travel to their countries
of origin without fear of being placed on watch lists or No-Fly Lists, and to
mobilize their communities politically without being subjected to closer
government scrutiny. 25
Rather than meaningfully addressing these problems, community
policing bolsters the broader strategy of integrating local police as the eyes
and ears on the ground in the federal counterterrorism regime. 26 As a result,
attractive federal grants seduce some local law enforcement into the
process, 27  while others eventually cease the project to preserve the
credibility necessary to receive community assistance in order to fight local,
Department of Justice and FBI lead the Joint Terrorism Task Forces through which both
state and federal law enforcement specialists join forces to combat terrorism).
24 See, e.g., Ten Years After 911 Hearings, supra note 19 ("The FBI's actions are not
limited to arrests and prosecutions; they take many forms-including recruiting potential
intelligence sources . . . ."); see generally Paul Butler, Gideon 's Muted Trumpet, N.Y
TIMEs, Mar. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/opinion/gideons-muted-
trumpet.html?ref=opinion&_r-0, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0PRQcCceM3PI] (noting
that "[t]he Supreme Court has famously stated that the prosecutor's interest 'is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' In our adversarial system, however, those
are just words on paper").
25 See, e.g., JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R42553, COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 14, 17 (May 31, 2012), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf (noting the need for training so officers can
distinguish when constitutionally protected activity crosses the line to criminal activity);
Gadeir Abbass & Adam Soltani, CAIR Officials: Man Sentenced to Life WithoutAir Travel,
NEwsOK, Feb. 13, 2013, http://newsok.com/cair-officials-man-sentenced-to-life-without-
air-travel/article/3754641/?page=1, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0uFlo47efem/].
26 See Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. of
Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 1 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-111hhrg57457/html/CHRG-111hhrg57457.htm, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OkNWrywblFv/] [hereinafter Working with Communities Hearing] (statement of Jane
Harman, Chair).
27 See The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization within their
Community: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/22/statement-record-principal-deputy-
counterterrorism-coordinator-john-cohen-house, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OGpuLtvt7Ke/] (statement of John Cohen, Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator)
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non-terrorism crimes. 28 In the end, for community policing to work, federal
law enforcement culture and practices must abandon the prosecutorial,
collective approach to policing and focus suspicion on individuals based on
predicate acts of criminal activity. In light of post-9/11 politics, which are
built on the assumption that Muslims are inherently prone to terrorism, 29
such changes are unlikely in the near future.
After describing the preventive counterterrorism strategy that
underpins CCP, Part II examines and critiques community outreach and
engagement programs that precede current calls for CCP. I call into question
the federal government's motives behind CCP based on its record of civil
liberties violations arising from community outreach and engagement
programs promoted, in part, to counter-radicalize and gather intelligence on
Muslim communities. Part III argues that community policing is an
extension of a counterterrorism strategy that collectively subordinates
Muslim communities. Rather than empower communities to reform rights-
infringing government practices, community policing co-opts them into not
only accepting but also legitimizing such practices. 30 Part IV concludes with
recommendations to de-racialize domestic counterterrorism; remove the
counterterrorism objectives from community policing with Muslim
(noting that DHS has expanded FY2012 grant guidance to include funding for CVE
training, partnerships with local communities, and local CVE engagements in furtherance
of White House's strategy); Waxman, supra note 2, at 399-400; John Sharp, Mobile Police
Department Seeking $1.7 Million Grant to Add 15 New Police Officers, AL.COM (May 15,
2013), http://blog.al.com/live/2013/05/mobilepolicedepartmentseeki.html, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/OM6uXoMErAPI].
28 See, e.g., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 17 (recognizing "tension
between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent
crime"); Sam Adams, Portland Offers Model on Terrorism Investigations, SFGATE, Apr. 3,
2012, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Portland-offers-model-on-
terrorism-investigations-3454219.php, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/OxvEHEphrjv/];
David A. Harris, The War on Terror Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 43 (2006) (noting
police refusal to participate in immigration enforcement as it impedes their ability to
combat crime). But see April Baer, Portland Back In Joint Terrorism Task Force with Some
Reservations, OPB (July 17, 2012), http://www.opb.org/news/article/portland-back-joint-
terrorism-task-force-some-reservations/, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0A33qrkfkLi/].
29 See Cole, supra note 14, at 234.
30 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 137; Alejandro J. Beutel, Building Bridges to
Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim
Americans and Law Enforcement, MUSLIM PUB. AFFs. COUNCIL (Nov. 2009), available at
http://buildingbridgeswny.org/articles/MPAC-Counter-Radicalization-Paper.pdf (calling for
increased funding for community policing as a means of "promot[ing] better intelligence
154
2014 /Policing Terrorists in the Community
communities; and ultimately de-securitize the relationship between Muslims
and government such that they are treated like any other American
community, more concerned with jobs, schools, and health care than
terrorism.31
As long as countering terrorism is driven more by the identity of the
suspect than by the nature of the crime, communities and local law
enforcement alike should reject community policing in counterterrorism. 3 2
II. Community Policing in Counterterrorism
Incorporating community policing into counterterrorism is not a
new innovation. Community policing was introduced in the 1960s as an
alternative to the traditional paramilitary policing model that soured
relations between law enforcement and minority communities. Community
policing operates on the premise that in a democratic society, police need
the assistance and resources of residents to address crime effectively. 33 In
theory, community policing is intended to empower minority communities
to define policing priorities and, accordingly, to better serve the safety and
gathering and minimize[ing] the negative impact on both community-police relations"). In
a future paper, I will engage in a programmatic critique based on a recognition that the
political economy of community policing created by federal grants and a cottage industry
of experts, coupled with the politics of terrorism in the U.S., nearly guarantees community
policing's near-term survival despite the detrimental subordinating effects.
31 See Jihad Turk & Salam Al-Marayati, U.S. Muslims are Not Measured by the Exemplary
Work of its Mainstream, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/guest-voices/post/us-muslims-are-not-measured-by -the-exemplary -work-of-its-
mainstream/2012/09/19/ef651132-0277-11e2-8102-ebee9c66el 90 blog.html, [http://
pena.cc/JF3F-Q8Y2]; Exec. Order No. 13515, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,635 (Oct. 14, 2009)
(regarding the need for increased Asian-American and Pacific Islander federal program
participation in light of their continued disadvantages and challenges).
32 Although others agree with my argument that community policing, also called countering
violent extremism, should be abandoned, they focus on cost-benefit analysis as opposed to
the subordinating and racialization basis of this Article. See, e.g., McCants & Watts, supra
note 8, at 5-6 (suggesting that if the numbers of terrorist group supporters and recruiters
are small enough, that the government should abandon its countering violent extremism
involvement and just apply traditional law enforcement methods to the problem); David
Stevens, In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the 'Preventing Violent Extremism'
Strategy, 80 POL. Q. 517, 522-23 (2009) (arguing against government intervention in
Muslim communities' affairs because an unfettered religious environment creates more
moderation among religious institutions).
3 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, COMMUNITY POLICING: CAN IT WORK? xx (2004); DAVID A.
HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING (2005) (discussing the
widespread use of community policing).
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socio-economic needs of their members. The model teaches communities to
engage in self-help by acting in ways that the local government is unable or
unwilling to do alone. 34 As one scholar succinctly describes, "[community
policing] is a philosophy of full-service personalized policing where the
same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from
a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with its citizens to
identify and solve problems." 35 Community policing also facilitates two-
way communication between the police and the public, encourages police to
work with social services agencies to prevent crime before it occurs, and
creates new channels for the police to learn more about neighborhood
problems. 36 Nonetheless, community policing remains a work in progress
and has produced mixed results. 37
The arrival of community policing in counterterrorism came on the
heels of informal efforts by federal law enforcement agencies to engage
with Muslim communities. Notably, federal government engagement with
Muslims has a different name depending on the audience and the political
context in which it is referenced. When speaking to politically conservative
audiences willing to fight terrorism at the expense of civil liberties,
government officials often use terms such as counterterrorism, counter-
radicalization, countering Islamic extremism, and fighting homegrown
terrorism. 38 When speaking to Muslims and civil libertarian audiences
3 Such a model would complement on-going efforts by the Muslim community to prevent
youth from developing extremist views and ensure efforts to spread violent interpretations
of Islamic tenets are thwarted. See Sheila Musaji, The False Claim that Muslims have No
Programs to Counter Radicalization, AM. MUSLIM (Sept. 26, 2013), http://
theamericamnuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/repeated-false-claim/0019755, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/09zCDS7MTU9/].
3 ROBERT TROJANOWICZ & BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY POLICING: How To GET
STARTED 3 (1994).
36 See WESLEY SKOGAN & SUSAN HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 5
(1997); Mitch Carr, Greensboro Police Release 2012 Crime Statistics, Fox 8 WGHP, Feb.
4, 2013, http://myfox8.com/2013/02/04/greensboro-police-release-2012-crime-statistics/,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/08kVoRGluFg/] (reporting that police chief credits
community policing for drop in crime, stating that "citizens getting involved and keeping
police well-informed helped stop many crimes before they could happen").
37See Murray, supra note 7, at 352; SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 36.
38 National Focus on Debate on Muslim Radicalization, Fox NEWS, Mar. 6, 2011, http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2011/03/06/national-focus-debate-muslim-radicalization/, [http:/
perma.cc/PQ8X-9JYF] (focusing on terms radicalization and extremism); Scott Erickson,
Violent Extremism Continues to Plague Homeland Security, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 14,
2011), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/14/violent-extremism-continues-to-plague-
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concerned with the erosion of civil rights and liberties in the post-9/11 era,3 9
the government uses more soothing terms such as countering violent
extremism, 40 community engagement, community outreach, 42 and, most
recently, community policing. 43  These variations in nomenclature are
distinctions without a difference.
Irrespective of the term employed, the federal government's
objectives are the same-to combat terrorism preemptively and
aggressively within Muslim communities through an adversarial criminal
justice system.44 While an in-depth explication of the debates surrounding
these terms is beyond the scope of this Article, the following discussion
provides a brief summary of each term as evidence that the government's
use of milder terminology to debunk allegations of rights violations is a red
herring.45  Critiques of government actions should focus on substantive
practices rather than fall prey to semantic distractions.
homeland-security/, [http://penna.cc/9X4L-DNJW] (focusing on counterterrorism and
violent extremism); James Jay Carafano, Steve P. Bucci & Jessica Zuckerman, Fifty Terror
Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-
terror-plots-foiled-since-9 -11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism,
[http://perma.cc/6A63-ACKL] (focusing on homegrown terrorism and radicalization).
39 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 26.
40 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 4; see Jim Kouri,
Napolitano's State, Local Cop Meeting on Extremism Vague, Say Critics, EXAMINER.COM
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/napolitano-s-state-local-cop-meeting-on-
extremism-vague-say -critics, [http://perma.cc/9X7B-V6JQ] (reporting conservative
members of audience complaining for absence of use of Islamic terrorism and notable
emphasis on countering violent extremism).
41 Community Engagement, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
community-engagement, [http://pena.cc/L6UN-ZNMF].
42 Id.
43 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Partnering with American Muslim Communities to Fight Crime, 4
COMM. POLICING DISPATCH 11 (2011), available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/
11-201 1/partnering-with-american-muslims.asp, [http://pena.cc/7S84-SFN2].
44 Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism, Rewriting the Narrative:
An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization, THE WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL'Y
(Mar. 2009), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/
PTF2-Counterradicalization.pdf (assessing counter-radicalization and countering
extremism in the context of counterterrorism strategy) [hereinafter Rewriting the
Narrative].
45 Robert S. Mueller, III, Nine Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the
U.S., FBI (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-
after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threat-to-the-u.s, [http://pena.cc/TWW6-KPM6].
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Accordingly, Section A describes the preventive counterterrorism
model that undergirds CCP. Section B demonstrates how counter-
radicalization, a component of counterterrorism, is disguised as community
policing as a tactic to persuade otherwise skeptical Muslim communities to
trust the government. And Section C examines the flaws in community
outreach programs-the more informal predecessors to the community
policing programs currently being promoted through federal grants and
federal counterterrorism policy. If one focuses on what the program actually
does, as opposed to what it is called, there is little that differentiates
prosecution-driven counterterrorism from counter-radicalization, countering
extremism, countering violent extremism, community engagement,
community outreach, and community policing.46 Part III then proceeds to
critique CCP as an extension of a counterterrorism strategy that
subordinates Muslims based on the racialized premise that they are
collectively prone to terrorism.
A. Community Policing as Preventive Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism is the most accurate descriptor of the federal
government's motives and objectives in its dealings with Muslim
communities in the United States, including within the community policing
model. Domestically, counterterrorism is synonymous with anti-terrorism
law enforcement in that it involves surveillance, investigation, and
prosecution of terrorist suspects.4 7  In the international context,
counterterrorism combines the military, law enforcement, intelligence, and,
most notably, counterinsurgency tactics of counter-radicalization that
disrupt terrorist groups' messaging and ability to recruit.48
Worth noting are the multiple definitions of "terrorism" within the
U.S. criminal code. 49 In this Article, I adopt the generic definition that an
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Ten Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note 19 (testifying that "to meet the
growing demand for surveillance, the Bureau has increased the number of unarmed
surveillance teams by 127 percent since 2001").
48 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 7; William C. Banks, Providing "Supplemental Security" The
Insurrection Act and the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. Nat'l Sec. L.
& Pol'y 39 (2009).
49 See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2012); U.S. Dep't of Defense,
Directive 2000.12 (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/coffes/
pdf/200012p.pdf; see also Danielle C. Jefferis, Battlefield Borders, Threat Rhetoric, and
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act of "terrorism" is an attack on civilians for larger political objectives,
whether couched in religious or secular narratives. 0 Similar to law
enforcement priorities in other criminal contexts, success in
counterterrorism is measured by the number of investigations, prosecutions,
and convictions." So long as these objectives are the primary indicia of
success, community policing will remain the handmaiden of
counterterrorism insofar as it is merely an additional tool in law
enforcement's toolkit.
In counterterrorism efforts, federal law enforcement relies heavily
on both preventive and reactive tactics.5 2 Preventive tactics in the post-9/11
era include: (1) surveillance of Muslims, mosques, and Muslim-owned
businesses;53 (2) aggressive use of FBI sting operations employing
the Militarization of State and Local Law Enforcement, 3 NAT'L SECURITY L. BRIEF 37,
51-53 (2012) (discussing problems with defining "terrorism"); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law
ofHomegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1715, 1718 n.10 (2010).
50 See McCants & Watts, supra note 8; Joshua Sinai, How to Define Terrorism, 2 PERSP. ON
TERRORISM 9, 10 (2008) (citing Boaz Ganor who defines terrorism as "a form of violent
struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political
goals"; also noting Ganor's assertion that "the use of 'deliberate' targeting of civilians in
order to achieve political objectives is what distinguishes a terrorist act from guerrilla war
fare, where military units are targeted"); Gordon H. McCormick, Terrorist Decision
Making, 6 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 473, 474 (June 2003) (stating "terrorism is a purposeful
activity, carried out in the name of a larger political objective, regardless of the individual
motives or group dynamics . . .").
51 Murray, supra note 7, at 352; Eric Lichtblau, EB.I. Tells Offices to Count Local Muslims
and Mosques, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/28/us/threats-
responses-american-muslims-fbi-tells-offices-count-local-muslims-mosques.html, [http:/
perma.law.harvard.edu/05rK4eDkZMp] (reporting the FBI's explanation for counting
mosques as establishing a yardstick for the number of terrorism investigations and
intelligence warrants that a field office could reasonably be expected to produce).
52 Benjamin G. Davis, A Citizen Observer 's View of the U.S. Approach to the War on
Terrorism, 17 TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465 (2008); Martin Innis, Policing
Uncertainty: Countering Terror Through Community Intelligence and Democratic
Policing, 605 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. 222, 226 (May 2006).
5 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Built Secret Files on Mosques Outside
NY, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/
NYPD-built-secret-files-on-mosques-outside-NY, [http://perma. law. harvard. edu/
OgCTQHTRvzU]; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents Show NY Police Watched
Devout Muslims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-
News/20 11/Documents-show-NY-police-watched-devout-Muslims, [http://
pena.law.harvard.edu/ODKpxrfleGR]. See generally AP & Probe into NYPD Intelligence
Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD, [http://
pena.law.harvard.edu/ObcAlXm8giq] (linking to related articles).
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informants and undercover agents; 4 and (3) ideologically based public
relations programs that focus on developing a counter-narrative to terrorist
organizations in the purported battle for the "hearts and minds" of Muslims
assumed to be intrinsically vulnerable to recruitment by terrorists."5 The last
of these three preventive methods is often called counter-radicalization,
countering extremism, or countering violent extremism depending on the
speaker's politics and the audience. 56
In contrast, reactive law enforcement tactics include investigation
of criminal activity, prosecution of suspects in the process of committing or
after committing a terrorist act, conviction, and incarceration.5 7
Notwithstanding the use of traditional reactive tactics, the federal
government has stated on multiple occasions that its counterterrorism
strategy is primarily preventive insofar as it seeks to prevent a terrorist act
from ever occurring.58 Thus, in contrast to murder, burglary, or other forms
of "traditional crimes," where law enforcement does not get involved until
54 CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 4 (finding that since 2009 nearly 50% of
terrorism cases involved informants and 15% of those informant cases can be considered
sting operations); id. at 26 (reporting that in 2007 and 2009, 71% of terrorism cases
involved an informant); Josh Gerstein, Boston Marathon Bombings Reignite Debate Over
Terror Stings, POLITICO, May 18, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/boston-
marathon-bombings-terrorism-stings-91584.html?ml=al_1, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
OmSg4GBQu8r].
5 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 3; Stevens, supra note 32; Rewriting the Narrative, supra note
44, at 16. But see McCants & Watts, supra note 8 (critiquing the "hearts and minds"
approach adopted from military counterinsurgency because there is no Muslim insurgency
in the homeland).
56 Rascoff, supra note 49, at 1718-19; HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4.
5 Murray, supra note 7, at 353.
58 Samuel Knight, Holder Addresses U.N. Counter-Terrorism Symposium, MAIN JUST.
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.mainjustice.com/2011/09/19/holder-addresses-u-n-counter-
terrorism-symposium/, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OC8oEs6ENSi]; Mueller, supra note
45 (stating that the FBI's number one priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks through
working with state and local law enforcement to share information and conduct operations
to prevent and dismantle terrorists plots); Homeland Threats and Agency Responses:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 112th Cong. 3, 6
(2012) (written testimony of Janet Napolitano, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sec'y) (stating
preventing terrorism is one of DHS's core missions and describing CVE and community
policing as ways of achieving prevention of terrorism at the community and local level);
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 16 (outlining President Obama's national
security strategy).
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after the criminal act has occurred, in counterterrorism they seek to predict
and preempt the terrorist act.59
While the objective of preventing terrorism before it occurs invites
little criticism from civil rights and liberties advocates, there is significant
disagreement about the point in time at which law enforcement powers
should be employed against individuals and groups. 60 Critics of existing
counterterrorism strategies argue that law enforcement should not be
authorized to spy on or investigate any person or group without
individualized suspicion of a predicate act of criminal activity. 61 Until
shortly after 9/11, this was the dominant investigative approach because it
was more rights-protective of political dissent, religious beliefs, and
practices of minority groups. 62 Moreover, civil liberties advocates criticize
pretextual charges for violations of tax, immigration, or other non-
terrorism-related laws against Muslims the government speculates will one
day become terrorists based on unsavory political or religious beliefs. 63 A
recent poll suggests the American public is divided but marginally more
concerned that the government's terrorism-related investigations will
59 Murray, supra note 7, at 359 (highlighting the traditional policing model as an inflexible
structure that is predominately reactive and unable to develop and sustain close working
relationships with the community in helping to control crime; whereas community policing
concentrates on crime prevention as its primary objective).
60 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference
(Oct. 25, 2001); Harris, supra note 28, at 6.
61 Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration ofReligious
Groups, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1201, 1203-04 (2003-2004); More About Suspicious Activity
Reporting, ACLU (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-suspicious-
activity-reporting, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0dhA2JrdbkK]; PRICE, supra note 5, at
15.
62 Lininger, supra note 61, at 1228-29; see PRICE, supra note 5, at 20.
63 Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583 (2005); Attorney General
John Ashcroft, supra note 60 (comparing terrorism prosecutions to mob prosecutions, for
which Robert F. Kennedy's Justice Department was "aggressive, using obscure statutes to
arrest and detain suspected mobsters"); Harris, supra note 28, at 6; Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Just., Tunisian Man Charged with Visa Fraud Related to Terrorism, Intended to
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infringe upon constitutionally protected rights than that constitutional
protections will inhibit these investigations.64
But the government's claims of an ominous homegrown terrorist
threat are belied by the facts. According to the New York University Center
on Law and Security, counterterrorism enforcement has resulted in 1,054
terror-related cases from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2011, of
which 576 cases involved Muslim defendants. 65 Since 9/11, terrorism has
claimed thirty-three lives in the United States compared to 180,000 murders
during the same time period. 66 The most common charges in terrorism-
related cases include conspiracy to commit terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction possession and training, false statements to a federal agent, and
providing material support to terrorist groups. 67 During that same ten-year
period, the federal government has prosecuted 300 counterterrorism cases
involving Muslim defendants, eighty-seven percent of which resulted in
conviction, mostly through plea agreements. 68 Since 2009, the government
has focused on "homegrown terrorism," a racialized version of domestic
terrorism with an explicit reference to Muslim terrorists 69-even though
only fourteen Muslim Americans committed or were charged with terrorist
crimes in 2012, down from twenty-one in 2011, twenty-six in 2010, and
forty-nine in 2009.70 Notwithstanding the potential for significant loss of
64 Washington Post Poll, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/
postpoll 20130418.html, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/0jFsyhKXSVi] (noting 48% of
polled individuals noted they are more worried that the government "will go too far in
compromising constitutional rights in order to investigate terrorism" compared to 41 % who
worry the government "will not go far enough ... because of concerns about constitutional
rights").
65 See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 7.
66 Homegrown Muslim-American Terrorism Down Third Straight Year, DUKE TODAY (Feb.
4, 2013), http://today.duke.edu/2013/02/muslimterrorism, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
Oc5CTMPFqTj] (noting that since 9/11 "terrorism" has claimed 33 lives in the United
States out of more than 180,000 murders during that same period). For statistics on crime
reporting, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUST./FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://
www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm.
67 CTR. ON LAw & SEC., supra note 13, at 23-24.
68 Id.
69 See Jefferis, supra note 49 (discussing rhetoric of homegrown terrorism threat).
70 See, e.g., LYNCH, supra note 19, at 10 (listing only cases involving Muslim defendants
when discussing the rise of domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorism
notwithstanding the documented rise in right wing, white hate groups); BIPARTISAN POL'Y
CTR., supra note 17, at 12; SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 22; Charles
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life caused by a terrorist act, 1 the fact remains that the risk of homegrown
terrorism to public safety is not commensurate with the significant
resources and political capital expended on strategies that
disproportionately compromise Muslims' civil liberties .72
B. Disguising Counter-Radicalization as Community Policing
Counter-radicalization is the label used to describe the preventive
component of counterterrorism strategy that confronts and challenges the
ideologies used by terrorist organizations to justify the use of violence.73
Prior to the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London,7 4 the U.S. government employed
counter-radicalization primarily in the international context as a "soft" tactic
in the War on Terror and in its broader counterinsurgency strategy. The
London bombings triggered fears in Western countries that their Muslim
populations may be a figurative "ticking bomb" inside their borders.76 This
led to heightened concerns with (Muslim) homegrown terrorism and
Kurzman, Muslim American Terrorism: Declining Further, DUKE TRIANGLE CTR. FOR
TERRORISM & HOMELAND SEC. 1 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/
files/2013/1 1/Kurzman Muslim-American Terrorism final20 1 3 .pdf.
71 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye & Michael S. Schmidt, Boston Bombing Suspect Indicted
on 30 Counts, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/
boston-bombing-suspect-is-indicted-on-3 0-counts. html?_r=0, [http://perma.law.
harvard.edu/03XgXzuaa6v].
72 Faiza Patel & Michael Price, Fusion Centers Need More Rules, Oversight, ROLL CALL
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/58 30/Faiza-Patel-Michael-Price-Fusion-
Centers-Need-More-Rules-Oversight-218271-1.html?pg=1, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
OnwBD9cVKr9]; see also STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S.
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & Gov'T AFF., 112TH CONG., FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND
INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 3-4 (Comm. Print. 2012) (noting that
the work of fusion centers appears to have violated the civil liberties of many U.S. citizens,
has not produced successful counterterrorism results, and cost between $289 million and
$1.4 billion in federal funds from 2002-2011).
7 Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-
Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2012).
74 Alan Cowell, After Coordinated Bombs, London is Stunned, Bloodied and Stoic, N.Y
TIMES, July 7, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/07/international/europe/07cnd-
explosion.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OpVWdiVLFLf].
75Dealing With Today 's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security: Employing Smart
Power, CACI INT'L INC. & U.S. NAVAL INST. 15 (Sept. 2009), available at http://
asymmetricthreat.net/docs/asymmetric threat 3_paper.pdf (referring to internationally
implemented counter-radicalization tactics as an area of defensive soft power and going on
to discuss the rule of law in soft power).
76 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 7 (calling for a domestic equivalent to the
State Department's Countering Violent Extremism policy "to prevent young Americans
from being radicalized at home").
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debates on how best to approach the perceived problem. 7 U.S. government
officials conferred with military experts78 and looked to Britain's Preventing
Violent Extremism program (commonly referred to as "Prevent"), 79 which
emphasized empowering whomever the government deems possesses
mainstream ideological alternatives to the terrorists' "us against them"
narrative.s0
Thus, counter-radicalization is the softer, "hearts and minds" facet
of counterterrorism that complements the harsher preventive and
prosecutorial tactics described above.81 Operationally, the objective is to
stop people from embracing extreme beliefs (an inherently subjective and
vague term) that might lead to terrorism, as well as to reduce active support
for terrorist groups. 82 Despite the documented rise in right wing White
supremacists and militia groups, 83 counter-radicalization programs in the
77McCants & Watts, supra note 8 ("Like the United Kingdom, the United States launched
its CVE enterprise in response to a perceived increase in radicalization among its Muslim
citizens.").
78 1d.
79 Stevens, supra note 32 (describing Britain's 'Radical Middle Way' initiative that is aimed
at "articulating a relevant mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic, proactive
and relevant to young British Muslims"); Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent
Violent Extremism, INST. OF RACE REL. 10 (2009) (offering an insightful critical assessment
of Britain's Prevent program based on interviews with Muslims in Britain); GREAT
BRITAIN HOME OFFICE, PREVENT STRATEGY 25 (2011) (describing Prevent program's goal
as "to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism").
80 J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson, Confronting the Ideology of
Radical Extremism, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 301 (2009); LYNCH, supra note 19, at 12;
Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam, WORLD PUB. OP. (Apr. 24, 2007), http://
www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.php, [http://
www.perma.cc/OM3fpNniyDT] (finding that nearly three quarters of Muslims surveyed in
four countries believed that the goal of U.S. foreign policy was to "weaken and divide the
Islamic world"). But see McCants & Watts, supra note 8 (noting that decreased sympathy
for terrorist organizations does not necessarily translate into decreased support).
81 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 8; Amna Akbar, Policing "Radicalization," U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
82 McCants & Watts, supra note 8; see Kundnani, supra note 79, at 20.
83 See, e.g., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 22 (documenting 1,018 active hate
groups); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a
Post-911 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 448-53 (2011); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross &
Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K., FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE
OF DEMOCRACIES 17 (Apr. 2009) (noting that America's most notorious homegrown
terrorists are white males of Christian backgrounds); Amy Forliti, FBI: Minn. Raid
Disrupts 'Localized Terror Attack', ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 6, 2013), available at http://
news.yahoo.com/fbi-minn-raid-disrupts-localized-terror-attack-163339217.html, [http://
www.penna.cc/OFV2L6bfW4S]; The State of Hate: White Supremacist Groups Growing,
LEADERSHIP CONF. (2009), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/
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United States focus almost exclusively on challenging certain
interpretations of Islam exploited by terrorist organizations to morally
justify violence in furtherance of the adherents' perceived notions of
justice.14
The 9/11 attacks triggered a spike in scholarship, political
commentary, and policy papers analyzing the philosophical and theological
underpinnings of different interpretations of Islam used to justify violence
in pursuit of a political agenda." With that came a cottage industry of
purported experts on "Islamic terrorism,"8 6 many of whom lack formal
education or degrees in Islamic history and theology. 7  Many of these
experts argue for an aggressive preventive model that focuses law
enforcement's attention on those holding ideologies of Islamic radical
white-supremacist.html, [http://penna.cc/8NPF-U968] (noting a 54% increase in the
number of hate groups between 2000 and 2008).
84 A similar contradiction occurs in Britain where it has implemented the Prevent program,
which has guided the U.S. government's countering violent extremist strategies. A.
Kundnani, supra note 79, at 11 (highlighting the British government's focus on Muslim
communities and disregard for right wing violent extremism); GREAT BRITAIN HOME
OFFICE, supra note 79, at 40 (noting that "Prevent should be proportionate and focused. We
regard this as particularly important because of the view that the last Prevent strategy was
disproportionate-in particular, that it stigmatised communities, suggested that they were
collectively at risk of radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem specific to
Muslim communities"); Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, supra note 83, at 7 (defining
radicalization as "the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment
not only to a system of beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society").
85 See generally MARC SAGEMEN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008); QUINTAN WIKTORIWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING:
MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST (2005); OLIVIER Roy, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH
FOR A NEW UMMAH (2004); Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 302.
86 The title 'terrorism expert' requires seemingly minimal objective criteria, leading to
many primarily white, politically conservative males monopolizing that title. With their
access to contacts in mainstream media, they are able to perpetuate subordinating
narratives of Muslims and terrorism unchecked. See, e.g., Benjamin Doherty, How a
Clueless "Terrorism Expert" Set Media Suspicion on Muslims after Oslo Horror,
ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (July 23, 2011), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/benjamin-
doherty/how-clueless-terrorism-expert-set-media-suspicion-muslims-after-oslo-horror,
[http://www.perma.cc/Ocwle8QCuNq].
87 Not Qualified: Exposing the Deception Behind America 's Top 25 Pseudo Experts on
Islam, Muslim Public Aff. Council (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/
publications/MPAC-25-Pseudo-Experts-On-Islam.pdf (highlighting 25 "experts" on Islam,
counterterrorism, and other Muslim-related areas and the lack of training and/or knowledge
these individuals have in said areas of expertise).
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extremism," and thus prioritizes counter-radicalization in counterterrorism
strategy.89 Proponents of counter-radicalization programs assert that the
government should focus on "break[ing] the radicalization cycle" 90 by
promoting moderate, mainstream Muslim voices to provide choices that
distract and dissuade those Muslims who may be tempted to join extremist
causes. 91
Such claims are problematic because scholars and policy analysts
have yet to theorize adequately what causes an individual to adopt certain
interpretations of Islam, deemed radical by the U.S. government, such that
they become "radicalized" on a path that may lead to political violence. 92
Beyond a general consensus that there is no profile or single path of
"radicalization" towards violence, 93 the social sciences literature is still
under development and provides little insight for law enforcement's
preventive and reactive counterterrorism objectives. 94  Without any
empirical evidence guiding law enforcement, the default strategy involves
Il Guy Lawson, The Fear Factory, ROLLING STONE 60 (Feb. 7, 2008); Stevens, supra note
32 (describing Britain's 'Radical Middle Way' initiative that is aimed at "articulate[ing] a
relevant mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic, proactive and relevant to
young British Muslims").
89 Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 305. Two years after this article was
published, the White House issued its "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States." See EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17.
90 Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 303; Adam Serwer, The Recruits, AM.
PROSPECT, Feb. 27, 2010, at 25-26 (2010).
91 Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 304 (recommending the creation of a
"counterradicalization forum" where policymakers and practitioners from various countries
compare notes and best practices"); Task Force, supra note 44; Kundnani, supra note 79;
Beutel, supra note 30, at 8.
92 See, e.g., John Horgan, Discussion Point: The End ofRadicalization?, START (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=416, [http://
www.penna.cc/OiCRqo8gp8K] (arguing that radicalization does not necessarily lead to
terrorism); Stevens, supra note 32, at 519; Task Force, supra note 44; BIPARTISAN POL'Y
CTR., supra note 17, at 7.
93 John Knefel, Everything You've Been Told about Radicalization is Wrong, ROLLING
STONE, May 6, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/everything-youve-been-
told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-20130506, [http://www.penna.cc/0HPZpmm2XEs].
94 See, e.g., Horgan, supra note 92 (discussing low rate of actual terrorist acts and evidence
that not all who engage in violent behavior necessarily possess radical beliefs and vice
versa); Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 307 (noting some terrorists are
driven by feelings of exclusion from their own societies, "trapped in poverty or
hopelessness within authoritarian [Middle East] regimes," or are well-educated and "live in
Western democracies but struggle with issues of belonging and identity"); see also
QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 11-
17 (2005) (summarizing the different theories on why individuals become terrorists).
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scrutinizing Muslims who are highly religious, hold unsavory or critical
political views of American domestic or foreign policy, and/or are first-95 or
second-generation Muslim immigrants deemed unassimilated into the
dominant Anglo-Judeo-Christian-American culture. 96
Continued criticism by civil liberties advocates that the term
"extremism" connotes lawful political dissent 97 caused the government to
adopt the term "countering violent extremism" ("CVE")98 to emphasize its
focus on those who engage or plan to engage in violence. 99 Nonetheless,
CVE mirrors counter-radicalization in its focus on messaging and programs
designed to counter extremist narratives attractive to a small but potent
group of extremists and civilian populations vulnerable to recruitment by
such extremists.100  Aside from the disproven claim that Muslim
communities in the United States are vulnerable to radicalization and
recruitment,101 critics point out that domestic CVE is defined differently
depending on the implementing agency. 102 To circumvent these critiques,
government officials and experts who call for counter-radicalization now
use "community engagement" as the descriptor.103 Despite its innocuous
name, community engagement is a counter-radicalization tactic and a
95 Jeff Kunerth, New Pew Study Finds Rise in Muslim and Hindu Immigrants to the U.S.,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 20, 2013, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/features/blogs/
religion-world/os-new-study-finds-increase-in-muslim-hindu-immigrants-20130520,
0,5651429,print.post, [http://www.perma.cc/06h6TRMf4MC].
96 Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, supra note 83, at 26 (noting the absence of a reliable
terrorist profile has caused law enforcement to stereotype immigrant and Muslim
communities as potential terrorists); Chon & Arzt, supra note 6, at 216.
97 Steve Gosset, ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Right
Direction, But. . ., ACLU (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-
lens-obama-plan-fight-violent-extremism-step-right-direction, [www.perma.cc/
OXhzAGYV2GL].
98 See EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17.
99 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 20-22.
100 Id. at 6; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 17 (accepting the claim that Muslims
are vulnerable to radicalization by virtue of being Muslim).
101 Kurzman, supra note 70; Charles Kurzman, David Schnauzer & Ebrahim Moosa,
Muslim American Terrorism Since 9/11: Why so Rare?, 101 MUSLIM WORLD 464, at 478,
passim (2011), available at http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/20 13/06/
Muslim American Terrorism Since 9.11 WhySo Rare.pdf.
102 McCant & Watts, supra note 8.
103 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 4 (arguing for coordination between engagement and
combating violent extremism).
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preventive component of the government's prosecution-driven
counterterrorism strategy.104
Critiques of the terminology of the federal government's
preventive, ideologically based counterterrorism programs have led to the
rise of community policing as the nom du jour.10 Among academics, the
skepticism lies in the reasoning that any law enforcement program defined
by the ideology of the targets is flawed by design and a nonstarter,
especially in light of the FBI's egregious violations of civil liberties in the
1960s and 1970s as part of COINTELPRO. 106 At the grassroots level,
skepticism among Muslim community leaders and constituents is due more
to the government's glaring failure to change counterterrorism policies and
practices that adversely impact or intentionally discriminate against
Muslims.1 0 7 But instead of de-racializing counterterrorism strategy, the
government has simply adopted a new name in an attempt to persuade
Muslim communities to be more cooperative. As such, community policing
is the latest example of the government's focusing on form over substance.
C. Community Engagement, Outreach, and Community Policing
Prior to the introduction of community policing into the post-9/11
counterterrorism discourse, "community engagement" and "community
outreach" were the labels most often used to describe the interactions
between Muslims and the federal agencies tasked with protecting the public
104 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 4, 18; see Kundnani, supra note 79, at 11; Working with
Communities Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Rep. McCaul) ("We must be working
together [with Muslim communities] to identify and implement real solutions to counter
radical violent ideology.").
105 French term of art that translates into "name of the day."
106 COINTELPRO, FBI RECORDS: VAULT, http://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro, [www.penna.cc/
OZrUqlLKMZa]; see generally STEPHEN Dycus, ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 154-56
(2012) (discussing COINTELPRO as "secret programs" designed to "expose, disrupt, and
otherwise neutralize" targeted organizations' activities and members through covert, often
unlawful or otherwise improper, activities. Targeted organizations included the KKK,
Black Nationalists, and the "New Left").
107 See Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 26-27 (2011),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3ff468del211ff853e hwm6beul5.pdf, [http://
penna.cc/OtALioSxYyR]; Kate Taylor, 14 Muslim Leaders Plan Boycott of Breakfast with
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from civil rights violations.108 As early as 2003, the U.S. Department of
Justice's Civil Rights Division, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's ("DHS") Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties ("CRCL"), 109
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hate Crimes section 1 o held
meetings of varying frequency with Muslim communities across the country
to discuss civil rights concerns and grievances." As a result, civil rights
outreach and engagement meetings have been narrowly limited to
individual cases of discrimination or hate crimes by private actors, leaving
unaddressed the broader systemic causes of both private acts of
discrimination and civil liberties infringements perpetrated by the
government.112
Operationally, outreach meetings are often run by low-level federal
bureaucrats who set the agenda with the same pre-selected and vetted
108 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TEN YEARS LATER: A REPORT ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION'S POST-9/11 CIVIL RIGHTS SUMMIT 4 (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/crt/publications/post911/post911summit report 2012-04.pdf.
109 The Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter Threat oflslamic
Radicalization Hearings] (statement of Michael Chertoff, Former Sec'y of Homeland Sec.)
(stating "[a]n effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic radicalization requires that
we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps to build trust and
respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and faiths").
110 Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 111th Cong. 9 (2010),
available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=17408 [hereinafter Nine Years After 911
Hearings] (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI); Working with Communities
Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Brett Hovington Chief, Community Relations Unit,
Office of Public Affairs, FBI) (describing community outreach as a tactic for preventing
violent radicalization).
"I Task Force, supra note 44; but see BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 17 (stating
that Secretary Napolitano views countering violent extremism as a more community-
oriented form of counterterrorism because it provides more "tips" from within the
community); see also Stevens, supra note 32, at 523 (recommending that government focus
on fairer treatment, social inclusion, overcoming systemic discrimination, removing social
and economic inequalities and ethnic ghettoization, and achieving greater level of
integration as opposed to countering radicalization).
112 Harris, supra note 28, at 55 (describing FBI's community outreach with Muslims); U.S.
Dep't of Just., Religious Freedom in Focus Newsletters, available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/crt/spec topics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletters.php, [http://perma.cc/
Om8oFf5w9Du] (reporting cases where individual Muslims' religious rights are defended);
FBI, Hate Crimes Accounting: Annual Report Released (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/december/annual-hate-crimes-report-released/annual-hate-
crimes-report-released, [http://penna.cc/0fh3JujQ9iS] (noting that nearly all cases involve
an individual victim).
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community members that purport to represent diverse Muslim communities
within a particular locale.113 Members of Muslim communities are rarely
consulted in the selection of community representatives to outreach
meetings.1 14 Nor are they informed of the content of such meetings."' Thus,
many outreach meetings have evolved into superficial meet-and-greets
wherein the same civil rights and liberties grievances are rehashed with
minimal policy reform. 116  Community leaders who are serious about
effectuating policy changes usually stop attending the meetings, leaving
their spots to be filled by individuals who may not have representational
legitimacy or who prioritize self-promotion over the communities'
collective interests. 117
Because no public oversight or accountability mechanisms exist,
the government and community participants have little incentive to produce
tangible policy reforms that systemically change counterterrorism practices.
Instead, the efforts tend to focus on eliminating the perception of disparate
treatment of Muslims." So long as government officials can honestly claim
that they met with Muslims a specific number of times, they can create the
appearance of collaboration that fulfills executive directives to engage
"I HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 15; Carpenter, Levitt &
Jacobson, supra note 80, at 322 (recommending that U.S. government only work with
Muslims and Arabs who have a demonstrated track record of competing with violent and
nonviolent extremists); see also Kundnani, supra note 79 (critiquing Britain's Preventing
Violent Extremism program as imposing government agendas on local Muslim
communities).
114 Patel, supra note 107, at 26-27.
"5 Id.
116 Id. (explaining that outreach meetings are generally perceived "as insincere" and "as a
one-way means for the government to gather information about community members'
religious practices").
117 Martin Innes, Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence
and Democratic Policing, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 222, 234 (2006)
(noting difficulty of determining who really represents a community's views); Joel F.
Handler, It5 Not So Simple, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY
COMMUNITIES 45, 46 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, eds., 1999) (noting in the traditional
community policing context "a few activists run the show"); Sahar Aziz, The
Contradictions of Obama & Outreach to American Muslims, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 19,
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sahar-aziz/obama-american-muslim-
outreach b 1152359.html?view=print&comm ref=false, [http://pena.cc/OYHCmqelZXr]
(many leaders see such meetings as merely pro forma, check-the-box events providing
political cover to the government).
"1 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 17-18 (stating that one of the core objectives
of counter-radicalization is to address the perception of discrimination or mistreatment).
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Muslim communities. 119 Moreover, the outreach meetings offer the
government a rebuke to critiques that it discriminates against or does not
respect the rights of Muslims. For if those allegations were true, the
reasoning goes, then such meetings would not be held. Of course, this
diversionary tactic misses the mark of the critiques, which focus on
systemic changes in policy and practices to which the government often has
no meaningful response. Thus, community outreach and engagement has
been dismissed by some civil liberties advocates as a mere public relations
campaign aimed to defuse allegations of religious and racial profiling. 120
But the flaws of community outreach and engagement extend
beyond the usual incompetence associated with some government programs
or failures to implement systemic reforms. Rather, there may be a more
insidious motive for outreach to Muslims. Specifically, federal agencies are
looking for potential recruits to serve as informants, identifying targets for
investigation and gathering intelligence about the mosques and Muslim
community life in that locale. 121 Since 2008, the National Counterterrorism
Center ("NCTC") and DHS have been working together to formulate a
coherent strategy for combating domestic violent extremism, while CRCL
has been engaging in outreach efforts with American Muslim communities
to address civil liberties grievances. 122  The collaboration of NCTC (an
intelligence agency created to counter terrorism) with CRCL (whose
119 Working with Communities Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Brett Hovington,
Chief, Community Relations Unit, Office of Public Affairs, FBI) (describing community
outreach as a tactic for preventing violent radicalization); see generally OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 16 (outlining President Obama's national security strategy).
120 But see Hussain, supra note 15, at 925 (critiquing the replacement of religious profiling
with cultural profiling as producing the same subordinating effect); ACLU: FBI Used
Outreach to Collect Info on Bay Area Muslims, KTVU & WIRES, Mar. 27, 2012, http://
www.ktvu.com/news/news/crime-law/aclu-fbi-used-outreach-collect-info-bay-area-musli/
nFrPF/, [http://penna.cc/0MX2514LW96].
121 Ten Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note 19 (testifying that "[t]he FBI's actions are not
limited to arrests and prosecutions; they take many forms-including recruiting potential
intelligence sources"); Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1195, 1231 (2003);
see also Letter from Laura Murphy, Legis. Dir., ACLU, to Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Just. (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
letter to oigre fbiprivacy act violations and improper targeting.pdf, [http://pena.cc/
OVv1XC4Msap/] (requesting an investigation into abuse of community outreach to gather
intelligence and coerce Muslims into serving as informants).
122 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 10; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 8; BJELOPERA,
supra note 25, at 7-8.
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mandate is to safeguard civil rights and liberties) on counter-radicalization
efforts raises legitimate concerns about the motives of government outreach
programs. Similarly, some community leaders have accused the FBI and
NYPD of exploiting the good faith of the Muslim communities at
engagement meetings to gather intelligence for law enforcement
purposes. 123
Recent FBI policies assigning U.S. Attorneys as the anchors of
federal outreach at the local level also raise questions as to the relationship
between counterterrorism enforcement and community engagement given
that U.S. Attorneys are also the lead prosecutors of anti-terrorism laws. 124
Their participation as lead conveners aggravates the inherent divergence
between Muslim communities' interests in protecting their civil liberties and
prosecutors' mandate to prosecute and show tangible results in the form of
convictions to account for the billions of taxpayer dollars spent on
counterterrorism. 125
In response to these critiques, the government has begun pushing
for community policing to replace community engagement and outreach as
a more formal program based on models developed in the 1990s in the
context of drugs, guns, and gangs. 126 Community policing has become
popular both among policymakers seeking to be more preventive in
counterterrorism and Muslim community leaders concerned with protecting
the civil liberties of their constituents. 127  For government officials,
"community policing" has the benefit of being a less politically charged
term than "counter-radicalization" or "countering violent extremism." It has
a positive connotation from a record of relative success when used to
improve relations between local police and African-American communities
123 Mike German, Is the FBJ's Community Outreach Program a Trojan Horse?, ACLU
NATIONAL SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/
fbis-community-outreach-program-trojan-horse, [http://penna.cc/0YGLuqm5Cjf/]; Harris,
supra note 5, at 140-41.
124 See EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17; STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EMPOWERING
LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 4; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 7; see also
BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 4-5.
125 See generally Setty, supra note 5 (discussing the application of interest convergence
theory to post-9/11 national security decisions affecting the civil rights of marginalized
communities).
126 BRIAN N. WILLIAMS, CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY POLICING 17, 42 (1998).
127 HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 5; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 4, at 16 (outlining President Obama's national security strategy).
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in inner city neighborhoods. 128 It also facilitates outsourcing counter-
radicalization objectives to nongovernmental Muslim organizations. 129
Muslim-American proponents of community policing believe it
offers a formal mechanism to reform selective counterterrorism practices. 13 0
As in the community outreach context, they believe that engaging with
local, state, and federal law enforcement on a regular basis builds
relationships of trust. 131 They feel it will give Muslim communities the
necessary political access to persuade law enforcement to: (1) stop
infiltrating Muslim communities and mosques with shady informants that
induce, if not outright entrap, vulnerable young Muslim men; (2) withhold
using their investigative authorities to open threat assessments on Muslims
without individualized suspicion of criminal activity; (3) permit Muslim
charities to donate humanitarian aid to Palestine, Kashmir, and other
conflict zones where designated groups operate without prosecuting them
for material support; and (4) refrain from exercising prosecutorial discretion
based on religious practices. 132 In the end, Muslim leaders in favor of
community policing believe the root cause of aggressive counterterrorism
tactics is law enforcement's misunderstanding of Islam, Muslims in
America, and the cultural practices of the diverse ethnicities that comprise
American Muslim communities. 133  Thus, some Muslims believe that
community policing allows the community to provide more accurate
128 WILLIAMS, supra note 126, at 17.
129 See, e.g., Rewriting the Narrative, supra note 44, at 18; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra
note 17, at 7; Kundnani, supra note 79, at 10.
130 See, e.g., Beutel, supra note 30.
311d. at 38.
132 Ryan Mauro, A Window on the Muslim Brotherhood in America: An Annotated
Interview with DHSAdvisor Mohamed Elibiary, CTR. FOR SEC. POL'Y (Sept. 2013), http://
www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Elibiary-Occasional-
Paper-1001.pdf; see Written Testimony of Asim Rehman, Federal Civil Rights Engagement
with Arab and Muslim American Communities Post 9/11, U.S. Comm'n on Civ. Rts. (Nov.
9, 2012), available at http://vc-mubany.s3.amazonaws.com/files/2012-11-11-19/
MuBANY_- USCCRWritten Testimony_- Nov_9 2012.pdf; Working with Communities
Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Mohamed Elibiary, The Freedom and Justice
Foundation co-founder).
133 Anita Khashu, Robin Busch & Zainab Latif, Building Strong Police-Immigrant
Community Relations: Lessons from a New York City Project, VERA INSTITUTE FOR JUST.
(Aug. 2005), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/BuildingPoliceImmigrant
Relations.pdf, [http://perma.cc/OkQUlqlLQbu]; Innes, supra note 117, at 231.
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information to law enforcement with the expectation that this will
fundamentally change counterterrorism practices. 13 4
These proponents' optimism, however, underestimates the deeply
entrenched adversarial nature of America's criminal justice system,135
overlooks the long history of disparate treatment of racial and ethnic
minorities, 136 and misunderstands the incentive structure governing law
enforcement agents and prosecutors. 137  Specifically, federal agents are
incentivized to recruit informants and increase the number of terrorism
investigations and indictments. 138  More importantly, proponents fail to
recognize that there is likely to be little substantive difference between
community policing and community outreach, which thus far has not been
shown to empower Muslim communities or stop harsh counterterrorism
practices. 139 Without structural reforms to federal counterterrorism strategy
and attendant practices, participants in locally based community policing
are likely to be deputized as counter-radicalization agents for the federal
government. As in the immigration enforcement context, 140 this harms both
Muslims and local police who cannot effectively combat crime without the
trust of the communities they serve.
In the following discussion, I argue that absent structural reforms to
counterterrorism strategy and the paramilitary culture of federal
counterterrorism enforcement, 141 locally based community policing will
134 Beutel, supra note 30, at 10; see Ramirez, Hoopes & Quinlan, supra note 121; Mark G.
Stainbrook, Policing with luslim Communities in the Age of Terrorism, POLICE CHIEF,
Apr. 2010, at 32, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?
fuseaction=displayarch&article id=2050&issue id=42010, [http://perma.cc/
OZM1IBCtARu/]; David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman & Ebrahim Moosa, Anti-Terror
Lessons ofluslim-Americans, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Jan. 6, 2010).
135 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
2117 (1998).
136 See Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note 121.
137 McCants & Watts, supra note 8.
13s Joshua Holland, Only 1 Percent of "Terrorists" Caught by the FBI are Real, SALON,
(July 10, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/10/only_1_percent-of-terrorists
caughtby fbi arerealpartner/, [http://penna.cc/0th5gfDgGyR/].
139 Threat oflslamic Radicalization Hearings, supra note 109.
140 Matthew Kolodziej, Local Immigration Enforcement Harms Community Policing and
Public Safety, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Sept. 13, 2009), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/09/13/
local-immigration-enforcement-hanns-community-policing-and-public-safety/, [http://
penna.cc/048RznhuQcS/].
141 Murray, supra note 7, at 352 (finding that community policing works only when law
enforcement agencies change their culture from an "us versus them" view of communities
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further the subordinating effects of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies and
alienate local police from Muslim communities. I also consider counter-
critiques in support of community policing.
III. Critiques and Counter-Critiques of Community Policing in
Counterterrorism
CCP paradoxically causes Muslims to engage with the same entities
that threaten their liberty and privacy interests, resulting in a fundamentally
different power dynamic from the traditional community policing context.
In traditional community policing, communities in crime-infested inner-city
neighborhoods seek the assistance of local law enforcement to protect them
from drug dealers, gangsters, and other violent criminals threatening the
safety of their schools, businesses, and homes. 142 Local law enforcement
and the communities have a common interest in protecting their
neighborhoods from being targeted by third-party criminals who exploit
high rates of unemployment, low quality schools, and a low police presence
to engage in violent crime. 143 While police have historically been a source
of civil rights grievances for minorities due to excessive force and pervasive
racial profiling, the communities are primarily concerned with criminals
potentially taking over their neighborhoods and the consequent risks to their
lives. 144 Thus, traditional community policing objectives merge the common
interests of police and communities to eradicate crime from their
neighborhoods. 145 In contrast, Muslims engage with federal law
enforcement and to a lesser extent with local police to protect their
to a partnership approach); Diane Cecilia Weber, Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of
Paramilitarism in American Police Departments, CATO INST. (Aug. 26, 1999).
142 See, e.g., Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 6 (2010).
143 Lara Herschberg, Ten Valuable Community Policing Strategies, GREEN HERITAGE
NEWS, Jan. 21, 2003, http://greenheritagenews.com/ten-valuable-community-policing-
strategies/, [http://perma.cc/0bQ5zXelpeq/] (highlighting ten policing strategies that have
been recognized internationally regarding community policing).
144 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC ONLINE (Mar.
1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/,
[http://pena.cc/KUF2-9EGE].
145 Bryan Fitzgerald, Albany Police Emphasize Stats, Community in Reducing Crime,
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communities from governmental infringements on their civil liberties and
consequent private acts of discrimination.
Another notable difference between traditional community policing
and CCP is that in the former, local police enforce traditional criminal law
whereas in counterterrorism, federal agencies enforce anti-terrorism laws. 146
Joint Terrorism Task Forces ("JTTFs") and state fusion centers comprised of
local and federal agents prioritize preventive counterterrorism based on
federal priorities. JTTFs are interagency squads led by federal agents for the
purpose of investigating terrorism matters and coordinating federal
counterterrorism efforts across the United States. 147 JTTFs are also the
primary vehicle by which the intelligence community and federal, state,
local, and tribal law enforcement are integrated in domestic
counterterrorism operations.1 48  Thus, locally operated CCP cannot be
effective without inclusion of the federal government, which requires major
changes to the locally driven traditional community policing model.
Accordingly, Section A challenges proposals to apply community
policing programs developed in the 1990s in the context of guns, drugs, and
gangs. I argue that community policing is likely to subordinate Muslim
communities by bolstering implementation of adversarial counterterrorism
strategies, asserting that the interests of Muslim communities in America do
not converge with those of law enforcement. 149 Specifically, community
policing defines relations between Muslim communities and local
government around federal counterterrorism priorities, props up the divisive
"Good Muslim/Bad Muslim" paradigm based on an individual's willingness
to accept government practices and policies, and deputizes Muslim leaders,
who may unwittingly share intelligence about their communities.
146 See, e.g., 18 USC § 2332b (2008); 18 USC § 2339b (2009).
147 HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct.
2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat-strat-homelandsecurity
2007.pdf, [http://pena.cc/0j7ZPQAJ7tn]; Lawson, supra note 88 (finding there are over
2000 FBI agents assigned to 102 JTTFs as of 2008); PRICE, supra note 5, at 17.
148 HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 50; see also Memorandum from
John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to All U.S. Att'ys, Cooperation with State and Local Officials in
the Fight Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/agdirectives5.pdf (instructing AUSAs to work with state and local officials on
countering terrorism).
149 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 101.
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Section B then examines critiques of this Article's thesis by
highlighting the four most often cited assertions by community policing
supporters. First, supporters claim that engagement through community
policing de-mystifies Muslims to law enforcement and thereby counters
negative stereotypes of the "Terrorist Other," which they believe contribute
to harsh counterterrorism tactics. Second, proponents believe community
policing will de-securitize Muslim communities by shifting the focus to the
underlying sociological causes of radicalization rather than reactive
investigation and prosecution. Third, some community policing supporters
argue that the Muslim community should engage in countering violent
extremism through internal conflict resolution mechanisms that in theory
are supposed to shield wayward youth from entering the criminal justice
system. And finally, proponents claim the relationships built in community
policing can result in incremental reforms to counterterrorism policies.
While each of these claims is reasonable in the abstract, in practice
they will leave supporters disappointed. The adversarial nature of the
criminal justice system, the secondary role of local police departments in a
federally run counterterrorism regime, the structural incentives of federal
counterterrorism agents to increase the number of investigations and
prosecutions, and the political powerlessness of Muslim communities in the
United States collectively minimize the likelihood that CCP will be as
successful as traditional community policing is in African-American
communities.
Unless federal law enforcement agencies undergo the same
paradigm shift in their approaches to counterterrorism as did their local law
enforcement counterparts in the 1990s15 o-which is unlikely in the current
political climate-Muslim communities should be wary of community
policing as a velvet glove disguising the iron fist of preventive
counterterrorism.
A. Community Policing and Subordination Post-9/11
Subordination theory posits that particular groups are racialized into
the outsider "Other" deserving of harsh treatment by the state to protect the
1 SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 36, at 5, passim.
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majority from a perceived threat.1 51 These "out-groups" disproportionately
carry the burden of distributional inequalities arising from abusive practices
sanctioned by the majority. 152 Calling into question the efficacy of the
prevailing emphasis on individual discrimination, 153  anti-subordination
principles call for group-based remedies that take into account how enemy
groups are racialized and constructed as outsiders.1 5 4 In the post-9/11 era,
Muslims are subordinated as the racialized "Terrorist Other" targeted by
aggressive national security laws and policies in response to the September
11th terrorist attacks. 155 Thus, remedies should focus on systemic disparities
that violate Muslims' civil liberties on a collective and not just an individual
basis.
Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf insightfully categorize
scholars' writing on post-9/11 national security law and policy into three
groups: unilateralists, proceduralists, and interventionists. 156 Unilateralists
favor granting the executive more power during emergencies because the
state's interest in survival outweighs any individual liberty interests.1 57 I
would add that this is especially so when those individuals are members of
an out-group of "Terrorist Others." Proceduralists focus on bolstering
structural and procedural protections in order to preserve essential American
constitutional values and decrease the risk of eroding the constitutional
framework.1 5 s Proceduralists, therefore, are not as concerned with where the
pendulum swings between state power and individual rights so long as the
procedures that allow the pendulum to swing in either direction are
151 Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, 50
VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1073-75 (2005); Chon & Arzt, supra note 6, at 220-21.
152 See Ashar, supra note 15, at 1196; Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in
URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 49, 54 (Joshua Cohen
& Joel Rogers, eds., 1999).
153 Robert S. Taylor, Hate Speech, the Priority of Liberty, and the Temptations of Nonideal
Theory, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 353, 357 (2012), available at http://
faculty.psdomain.ucdavis.edu/rstaylor/papers/Hate%/ 20Speech.pdf.
154 Hussain, supra note 15, at 934.
155 See JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICAN'S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN
MINORITY 65 (2009); Chon & Arzt, supra note 6, at 216; Susan Akram & Kevin Johnson,
Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs
andMuslims, 58 N.YU. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 295, 299 (2002).
156 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at 434.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 435.
178
2014 /Policing Terrorists in the Community
preserved.159 For them, protecting the rights of out-group minorities is not a
concern in the short term provided that in the long run their rights can be
protected after the public recovers from the expected overreaction to the
national emergency. 160 Hence Muslims' group and individual rights are
justifiably subordinated to procedural and structural protections. 161
In contrast, the interventionists argue in favor of restraining
executive authority to protect civil liberties. 162 Although they agree with the
unilateralists and proceduralists that 9/11 created a national emergency,
interventionists insist that rigid constitutional interpretation favoring
individual rights by an intrepid judiciary preserves America's constitutional
values, especially during times of national emergency. 163 Interventionists
face an uncomfortable dilemma wherein they critique Bush and Obama
policies as a deviation from the norm while remaining simultaneously
cognizant that the pre-9/11 American criminal justice system subordinated
communities of color through police brutality, the death penalty, religious
intolerance, and racial profiling. 164 Thus, they seek to highlight post-9/11
violations as a continuation, even if more egregious in degree, of pre-9/11
subordination of communities of color. 165
Some interventionists base their critiques in immigration and
alienage law, 166 while others argue that racial subordination is the critical
center of gravity that explains the cause and effect of post-9/11 national
159 Id. at 436. But see Gott, supra note 151, at 1084 (critiquing the limitations of process-
based, institutionally oriented frameworks for examining the legality of government action
in national security emergencies).
160 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at 440; see generally THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
THE PATRIOT ACT READER: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2004/pdf/
the-patriot-act-reader.pdf (providing a proceduralist's analysis in support of the PATRIOT
Act by politically conservative scholars).
161 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at 440, 446-47.
162 Id. at 433.
63 Id. at 442.
164 Id. at 445; see also Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note 121, at 1214 (noting that
the onus imposed by constant suspicion by law enforcement causes targeted communities
to share a massive sense of injustice and destroys relations with law enforcement).
165 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at 444-45.
166 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002); Karen Engle, Constructing
GoodAliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REv.
59 (2004); see Ashar, supra note 15.
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security laws. 167 My thesis, which falls under the latter approach, agrees
with interventionist scholars that the state of pre-9/11 civil rights and
liberties for communities of color left much to be desired. Thus, a critique
of post-9/11 policies must be contextualized against pre-9/11 laws that
disparately impacted minority groups, which laid the foundation for
post-9/11 policies targeting Muslims. 168 As such, I argue against CCP. In
contrast to anti-drugs, -gangs, and -guns efforts where police work with
communities to protect them from third-party criminals, community
policing in counterterrorism co-opts Muslims into participating in a
preventive counterterrorism regime that perpetuates Muslim communities'
subordination in American society.
Notwithstanding official government statements that not all
Muslims are terrorists, 169 government practices impose racialized, group-
based social harms on Muslim communities across the country.170 Post-9/1 1
subordination of Muslims manifests itself in various laws, policies, and
practices that effectively signal to the public that "those" Muslims are
forever foreign, disloyal, and unworthy of empathy because "they" want to
kill and terrorize "us" Americans, thereby relegating Muslims to second-
class citizenship. 171 Pervasive government scrutiny of Muslim communities
imposes significant dignitary and stigmatic costs on individuals and chills
167 Gott, supra note 151, at 1100.
168 Implicit in my thesis is an agreement with James Forman, Jr., who argues that the War
on Terror is merely a replication of the War on Crime and, subsequently, the War on Drugs,
thereby making it a racially subordinating counterterrorism strategy analogous to, and a
post-9/11 extension of, the subordinating "wars" on crime and drugs but for a different
target community. See generally James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on
Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.YU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331
(2009).
169 See, e.g., David Eldridge, Obama: America Not at War with Islam, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
8, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/8/obama-america-not-war-
islam/, [http://perma.cc/M3W2-7AZA]; EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17, at
2.
170 Hussain, supra note 15, at 924-25, passim.
171 See, e.g., Hussain, supra note 15, at 923 (noting history of suspicion of cultural
minorities when the nation faces external threats); Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at
438-39 (highlighting that under the Obama Administration there has been a marked
increase in retributive and venomous narratives about Islam and national security); David
Stevens, supra note 32, at 523 (arguing that overcoming segregation, political exclusion,
and discrimination are the most effective means of preventing extremism that may lead to
violence).
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their willingness to engage in religious and cultural practices that define
them. 172
As a consequence, Muslims are pressured to downplay their
religious identity while attempting to assimilate1 73  by adopting local
accents, remaining deferential and cheerful in the face of government
targeting, and engaging in hyper-patriotic acts such as displaying American
flags in their homes and businesses.17 4 In addition, they fear becoming too
active in the religious activities of a Muslim community because this will be
viewed as anti-assimilationi st and indicative of terrorist inclinations. 7
Muslims cease engaging in identity performance expressed through public
prayer, wearing headscarves, attending Muslim community events, or other
activities that foster a Muslim group identity. 176 Instead of being welcomed
as an act of citizenship, Muslims' civic participation is discredited as
disingenuous at best, or duplicitous at worst.17 7 In the end, Muslims are
disempowered from shaping their relationships with other Americans so
172 Hussain, supra note 15, at 935-36; Ashar, supra note 15, at 1196; Chon & Arzt, supra
note 6, at 246; John Knefel, Police Spying on American Muslims is a Pointless National
Shame, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/police-
spying-on-american-muslims-is-a-pointless-national-shame-20 130 3 11, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/07AfNBg7ioy].
17 See, e.g., Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins ofMuslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 U.C.L.A.
J. Islamic & Near E. L. 121, 125-29 (2008-2009); TEHRANIAN, supra note 155, at 65.
174 See, e.g., Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women
in the Crosshairs oflntersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 191, 227 (2012);
John Tehranian, Selective Racialization: Middle-Eastern American Identity and the
Faustian Pact with Whiteness, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1201, 1224 (2008); see also DEBORAH A.
RAMIREZ, SASHA COHEN O'CONNELL & RABIA ZAFAR, DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS
BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AMERICAN MUSLIM, ARAB, AND SIKH COMMUNITIES: A
PROMISING PRACTICES GUIDE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2004), available at http://
www.northeastem.edu/law/pdfs/academics/pfp-exec-sum-dnld-ver.pdf.
1 See BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2009),
available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights/report-blocking-faith-freezing-charity,
[http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0ARt4r2Lcjh].
176 Teresa Watanabee, Quakers Promote Immigrant Rights: Citing an Increase in Abuses
Since the Sept. 11 Attacks, the Group is Asking Those Who Have Been Victimized to Step
Forward, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/nov/11/local/me-
immigration11, [http://penma.law.harvard.edu/0VpBip6U8Jh]; Muslim Comty. Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, Civ. No. 03-72913, 31 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2003) ("Some members have asked
me and other Friday prayer leaders to avoid speaking about political issues fearing that any
public discussions of controversial political issues will place more suspicion upon the
[Muslim community center] and make us more likely targets of government investigation
and surveillance.").
177 See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 83, at 484 (discussing congressional hearings criticizing
Muslim leaders' cooperation with government).
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long as government counterterrorism strategies target and stigmatize their
communities.
CCP aggravates these problems by presuming that Muslims, as a
group, are aware of individual Muslims' terrorist inclinations or plots by
virtue of sharing the same faith. Imposing guilt-by-association, law
enforcement expects Muslims to know more about each other than other
communities with members that have engaged in domestic terrorism.s17 For
example, law enforcement has yet to invest in community policing
programs focused on Christian evangelical communities that support
bombing abortion clinics or attacking doctors who administer abortions, 179
far-right Christian communities that stockpile weapons because they wish to
overthrow the government or believe the end of the world is near, 1s0 or
predominantly Anglo patriot groups that engage in violence against
undocumented immigrants based on their opposition to immigration
reform.' This obvious inconsistency in the treatment of groups that have
members that engage in domestic terrorism, insofar as a few members'
crimes are not imputed on their demographic communities, raises the
question of why law enforcement is pursuing community policing with
Muslims. The answer, it appears, is that doing so offers an additional tool
for law enforcement to gather intelligence in furtherance of an adversarial
system that prioritizes bolstering the number of terrorism investigations,
prosecutions, and convictions of Muslims in America. 182
17s See Harris, supra note 5, at 134 (accepting this assumption when arguing for community
policing between law enforcement and Muslim communities); Harris, supra note 28, at 46-
47.
179 See, e.g., Associated Press, Bobby Joe Rogers Sentences to 10 Years for Firebombing
Abortion Clinic in Pensacola, HUFF. POST, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/10/04/bobby-joe-rogers-10-year-sentence-firebombing-abortion-clinic n
1940670.html, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/07WtuRFuc2G]; David Barstow, An Abortion
Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y TIMES, July 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/26/us/26tiller.html?pagewanted=8&_r=0&ref=georgertiller, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/08H4Zbz4QkU].
Iso See, e.g., Nick Bunkley & Charlie Savage, Militia Charged With Plotting to Murder
Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/us/
30militia.html?_r-0, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OtgHo8irVj4].
I'l See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Evidence Aside, State Lawmakers Debate 'Birther 'Bills, N.Y
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/us/politics/22birthers.html,
[http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OePnEgRxcxS].
182 See Murray, supra note 7, at 352; Harris, supra note 28, at 56 (noting the FBI seeks to
build relationships with Muslims to exchange intelligence).
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While a substantive critique of government actions that subordinate
Muslim communities as the "Terrorist Other" is beyond the scope of this
Article,183 it is worth highlighting some of the most problematic practices
that form the basis of most Muslims' civil liberties grievances.1 s4 They can
be categorized into three categories: religious and racial profiling, selective
counterterrorism enforcement, and private acts of discrimination. First,
government religious and racial profiling manifests itself in the
disproportionate number of false positives of Muslim names on travel watch
lists and the No Fly Lists;s" the prevalence of Muslims stopped for
heightened border screening;18 6 and the large number of Muslims targeted
for "voluntary" interviews by law enforcement and immigration agencies.1 87
Second, selective counterterrorism enforcement disproportionately
targets Muslims for terrorism investigations and surveillance;8 tasks
183 See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 83.
184 LYNCH, supra note 19, at 11.
185 Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); LYNCH, supra note 19, at 22 (noting that
terrorist no-fly watch lists continue to expand); Amy Pavuk, Muslim Businessman Sues
Homeland Security, Says Harassed while Traveling, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 22, 2012,
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local/breakingnews/os-muslim-sues-dhs-watch-
list-20121222,0,4387436.story, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0ZFzQtgz6gf] (discussing
Muslim man harassed over lengthy period of time when traveling because on watch list).
186 Hussain, supra note 15, at 939-40 (highlighting case where federal agents gave coercive
effect to private cultural profiling when passenger aircraft crew kicked a Muslim doctor off
of the plane and another crew refused to fly unless passengers wearing traditional Afghan
dress were run through a second security screening); see Susan Stellin, Security Check Now
Starts Long Before You Fly, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/22/business/security-check-now-starts-long-before-you-fly. html?
pagewanted=1&_r- 1&hp, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/02jX4JDTub3].
187 Hussain, supra note 15, at 924; Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First
Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. L. REv. 41 (2011) (discussing
"voluntary" interviews and their consequences for interviewees); ADC Requests DHS Civil
Liberties Investigation Into: Operation Frontline Targeting Muslims in 2004, AL JAZEERAH
CROSS CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING (Feb. 28, 2009), available at http://www.ccun.org/
Opinion%20Editorials/2009/February/28%20 o/AD C%20Requests%20DHS%2 0 Civil
%20Liberties%20Investigation%20into%200peration%20Frontline%20Targeting
%20Muslims%20in%20the%20US%20in%202004.htm, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
OgREL8qBUXF]; Seth Cline, The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: A New Threat
Emerges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 26, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/
press-past/2013/02/26/the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing-a-new-threat-emerges, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OXoHb3cDxgF] (discussing a Triangle Center on Terrorism
Homeland Security Study which noted Muslim Americans caused only 33 of the over 300
post-9/11 deaths by acts of political violence or mass shooting).
188 See generallyAP & Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations, supra note 53.
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dubious informantsl89 to prey on Muslim men with diminished mental
capacity and financial problems; 190 maps and spies on Muslim student
associations, mosques, and Muslim-owned businesses; 191 imposes special
registration requirements on Muslim men between the ages of fifteen and
forty-five; 192 issues thousands of National Security Letters to banks and
businesses that service Muslim clients;193 deports imams and religious
leaders whose sermons are deemed too critical of the American
government;194 and criminalizes charitable giving and political associations
189 Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645.
190 Harris, supra note 5, at 128-29 (summarizing the FBI and NYPD's abusive use of
untrained civilians as informants to spy on Muslim religious and cultural institutions);
Lawson, supra note 88 (critiquing the government's use of informants to induce vulnerable
defendants who posed little if any demonstrable threat to anyone or anything into
government concocted terrorist plots); Associated Press, FBI: Informant Close to
Entrapping Would-Be Bomber, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/fbi-infonnant-close-entrapping-would-be-bomber, [http://perma.cc/9YZR-7APL];
CAIRtv, Calif Man Arrested in Terror Plot May Need Psychiatric Evaluation, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 15, 2013) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXjwGCvnDpY&sns=em, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OmHMT11WLcU]; TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY:
INSIDE THE FBI's MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 146, 195 (2013).
191 Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 53; Matt Apuzzo & Charles Hawley, NYPD
Infiltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 11, 2011, http://
www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-
fears, [http://pena.cc/S6FZ-ER4E]; Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman & Eileen Sullivan,
NYPD & Spying Programs Yielded only Mixed Results, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 23, 2011,
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/201 1/NYPD-spying-programs-yielded-only-
mixed-results, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0KMzF3YZrnc]; see also Harris, supra note
5, at 171.
192 See, e.g., The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy, RTS.
WORKING GRP. (2012), available at http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/
RWGPenn NSEERSReport 060412.pdf, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/OAbQBZ4b4uX];
NSEERS: The Consequences of America s Efforts to Secure Its Borders, AM. ARAB ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION COMM. (2009), available at http://www.adc.org/PDF/nseerspaper.pdf;
MOUSTAFABAYOUMI, RACING RELIGION (2006).
193 See, e.g., Shafiqa Ahmadi, The Erosion of Civil Rights: Exploring the Effects of the
Patriot Act on Muslims in Higher Education, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 1, 20-25
(2011); Nina J. Crimm, Muslim-Americans' Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a
Centralized Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 375, 390-
91(2008).
194 E.g., Profile: Imam Fawaz Damra (PBS television broadcast July 7, 2006), http://
www.pbs.org/now/shows/227/imam-fawaz-damra.html, [http://perma.cc/5996-AL7R]; see
also Jay Weaver, Federal Judge Throws Out Taliban Terror Case Against Margate Imam,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/17/3187003/judge-
throws-out-taliban-terror.html, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/07EHNaZnwWk]; Associated
Press, Former Ohio imam deportation to Israel angers USMuslims, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 11,
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through broad material-support-to-terrorism laws.195
Selective enforcement is facilitated by relaxed investigative
guidelines. After 9/11, the FBI relaxed its internal investigative guidelines
for counterterrorism to allow agents to conduct threat assessments without
having to show a predicate act of illegal activity. 196 In 2002, former
Attorney General Ashcroft granted FBI agents authority to spy on religious
groups and houses of worship, members of which were most likely to be
Muslims. 197  Further expanding investigative powers, Attorney General
Mukasey in 2008 allowed agents to initiate threat assessments on anyone so
long as there was a national security objective, irrespective how tenuous. 198
In the few instances when agents are caught violating these lax guidelines,
the Department of Justice reminds the complainant that the guidelines do
not create enforceable rights for private actors. 199  These policy
developments demonstrate that the rhetoric of cooperation, mutual trust, or
2007, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/01/11/2003344292, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/mPrV7GBhey]; Maria L. La Ganga & Rone Tempest, U.S. Will
Drop Charges: 2 Lodi Men to Be Deported, LA TIMES, July 16, 2005, http://
www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9488.htm, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OePBfuBWZNE]; Chon & Arzt, supra note 6, at 225 (discussing parallels between
deportation of imams post-9/11 and arrests and detentions of Buddhist priests during
Japanese internment and WWII).
195 See BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY, supra note 175.
196 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Attorney Generals Guidelines on
Domestic Security Investigations (1976), reprinted in FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 50-53 (1977). The requirement to show predicate acts indicative of criminal activity
was imposed in the 1970s after congressional investigations uncovered a pervasive pattern
of abusive and illegal domestic intelligence of dissident religious, political, and social
groups. Harris, supra note 5, at 155-56. Because informants were a key component of
the illegal spying on these peaceful, law-abiding groups, then-Attorney General Edward
Levi established internal investigative guidelines that constrained the FBI's use of
informants in political and religious groups to only those instances when the agent could
provide "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group
is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence" and upon
approval from FBI headquarters. THE F.B.I.: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 38 (Athan G.
Theoharis, ed., 1999) (reviewing the Levi Guidelines).
197 Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft Permits EB.I. to Monitor Internet and Public Places, N.Y
TIMES, May 31, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/31/national/31INQU.html, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OGaeUu7txd5].
198 Harris, supra note 5, at 157-58.
199 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES Section
I.F (2006), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/chs-guidelines.pdf.
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convergence of interest is a public relations strategy to offset the expected
grievances arising from the attendant civil liberties violations.
Finally, the third category-private acts of discrimination-is partly
a consequence of the legitimizing effect of government subordination of
Muslim communities. 200 As the public interprets the government's actions
as part of reasonable national security policies, private actors feel justified
in discriminating against Muslims in employment, housing, education, and
public accommodations. 201 Even worse, private actors appear to believe
they are protecting public safety by vandalizing mosques with anti-Muslim
graffiti and dead pigs, 202 burning down children's play centers, 203 and
throwing firebombs to scare "those" Muslim terrorists away from "our"
country. 204
The effects of subordination are expressed through Muslims'
palpable fears of being under constant scrutiny and consequently vulnerable
200 Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note 121, at 1225; Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation
Challenged: Civil Liberties; Americans Give in to Racial Profiling, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 23,
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/200 1/09/23/us/a-nation-challenged-civil-liberties-
americans-give-in-to-race-profiling.html, [http://pena.cc/MP9V-DMSX] (reporting that
"58% of Americans surveyed backed more intensive security checks for Arabs, including
those who are United States citizens, compared with other travelers; 49% favored special
identification cards for such people, and 32% backed 'special surveillance' for them").
201 Ibrahim, supra note 173, at 144-45.
202 See, e.g., Pamela Constable & Tara Bahrampour, Virginia Mosques Vandalized; Area
Muslim Leaders Call for Calm, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2012, http://
articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-15/local/35496968 1 first-mosque-mosque-
officials-muslim-leaders, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/OAZqWiS7B2C/]; Pig Legs Found
at Proposed Mosque Site in Ontario in Apparent Vandalism Act, ABC NEWS, Aug. 11,
2012, http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section-news/local/inland empire&id=8770248,
[http://perma.cc/WDE5-VGVS]; Associated Press, Feds Charge Three Suspected White
Supremacists for Tennessee Mosque Bombing, Fox NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,330504,00.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OYhwHFhuwnH]; Uzma Kolsy, Eight Attacks, 11 Days, SALON.COM, Aug. 14, 2012, http://
www.salon.com/2012/08/14/eightattacks_11_days, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OnqZTj7sYFB].
203 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Arlington, Texas, Man Sentenced to 14
Months in Federal Prison on Federal Hate Crime Conviction (Oct. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRelll/glaspellsen.html, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OVyyeswkit] (noting that defendant admitted to setting fire to
playground equipment at mosque, among other acts).
204 Hussain, supra note 15, at 939; Gott, supra note 151, at 1119 (citing ADC report that
documented 74 cases of violence or threatened violence in schools in the first six months
after September 11).
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to adverse government action or private acts of bias. 205 Presumed to be
collectively suspect, some Muslims feel they are watched closely by their
co-workers or neighbors, 206  spied on by informants and undercover
agents, 207 and targeted by high profile counterterrorism sting operations. 208
These fears are validated as more Muslims experience hate crimes, school
bullying, and employment discrimination. 209 Residents of some towns have
pressured local governments to bar mosque constructions and expansions on
grounds that they are terrorist breeding centers. 210 Opponents of mosque
205 See, e.g., BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY, supra note 175, at 90; Lininger, supra
note 61, at 1233-34.
206 See, e.g., Ending Racial Profiling in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2012), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-4-17RomeroTestimony.pdf
[hereinafter Ending Racial Profiling Hearings] (statement of Anthony D. Romero,
Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union) (quoting a Muslim law student: "I and
other community members feel betrayed by our own police force, and the fact that it's the
police singling out Muslims for unfair treatment makes us all deeply concerned that other
parts of society see us as suspect, too, even though we've done nothing wrong . . . My
fellow students describe censoring themselves in classes to avoid saying anything that
might be taken as controversial or out of the mainstream on contemporary political issues
even where they should be most free-in academia. They are afraid that if they are seen as
'too Muslim' in their views, non-Muslim students and professors will see them as suspect,
like the NYPD has"); Thomas Cincotta, From Movements to Mosques, Informants
Endanger Democracy, PUBLIC EYE (2009), http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/
movements-to-mosques.html, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0iGV8EuV5F7] (quoting
Shakeel Syed, Executive Director of Islamic Shura Council in southern California: "What
these [informants] have done is create an environment where every person begins to
suspect the other and with the infighting and inward suspicion, the community becomes its
own victim").
207 Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 684; Jay Weaver, Judge Throws Out Taliban Terror
Case Against Margate Imam, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/
2013/01/17/3187003/judge-throws-out-taliban-terror. html#storylink=cpy, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OxhlnCL5Etp/] (reporting that the FBI sent a confidential
informant to infiltrate a Miami mosque).
208 See, e.g., AP & Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations, supra note 53.
209 See, e.g., Press Release, ISPU, The Bullying of Muslim Children is on the Rise,
available at http://www.ispu.org/GetPressRelease/49/12/PRCenter.aspx, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/ONTgJmlBys1/]; William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S.
Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1213, 1234-39 (2003-
2004); Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight
Years After 9/11, N.Y CITY L. REv. (2009); Vigil Held at Muslim Home Struck by Arson,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/
20 12/02/02/vigil-held-at-muslim-home-struck-by-arson.html, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OJrGtA4eCVFI].
210 See, e.g., Erica Ritz, Banning Mosques? Colo. State Senator 's Remarks Have CAIR
Outraged, THE BLAZE (July 17, 2012), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/07/17/
banning-mosques-colo-state-senators-remarks-have-cair-outraged/, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/Oc3URpRxNj6/]; Travis Loller, Murfreesboro Mosque Construction
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constructions unabashedly accuse Muslim citizens, many of whom were
born in the area or have lived there for decades, of being terrorists. 211 These
contentious public debates demonstrate the extent to which the "Terrorist
Other" stereotype has become a staple in American culture. 212
Unsurprisingly, this leaves Muslim communities distraught at the collective
guilt and scrutiny imposed on them merely because they are Muslim. 213 It
also leaves them feeling physically unsafe, not knowing if their neighbors'
hateful speech may one day turn into physical violence. 214
Will Be Stopped, Rules Chancellor Robert Corlew, HUFF. POST, May 29, 2012, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/29/murfreesboro-mosque-const_n_1553622.html,
[http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0zLYAW8GHGs].
211 See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Christian Conservative Leader Calls for No More Mosques
in U.S., CBS NEWS, Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503544 162-20013448-503544.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/OklQeCy9pK7/]
(quoting American Family Association's Bryan Fischer: "Permits should not be granted to
build even one more mosque in the United States of America .. . [because] each Islamic
mosque is dedicated to the overthrow of the American government"); Mark Potok, The
Patriot Movement Explodes, 145 Intelligence Report, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
(2012), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-infonned/intelligence-report/browse-all-
issues/20 12/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
04snuBlrzY5]; Saeed A. Khan, Sharia Law, Islamophobia and the U.S. Constitution: New
Tectonic Plates of the Culture Wars, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 123
(2012).
212 CNN Wire Staff, In Battle to Build Mosque Near Ground Zero, Opponents Ask 'Why
There?', CNN, July 21, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/14/
new.york.ground.zero.mosque/index.html, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/OatoSGm7aiS/]
(quoting opponent of mosque construction: "It would be a terrible mistake to destroy a 154-
year-old building in order to build a monument to terrorism"); Edward Colimore, After
Months of Controversy, a Unanimous Yes for Mosque, PHILLY.COM, Nov. 8, 2003, http://
articles.philly.com/2003-11-08/news/25461940_1_zoning-board-site-plan-mosque, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OZXdDYbyQSN/] (reporting anonymous fliers warned public that
new mosque could "attract worshipers with links to terrorists"); see Chon & Arzt, supra
note 6, at 224-25.
213 Haviv Retig Gur, American Muslims on Edge in Wake ofBoston Attacks, Apr. 20, 2013,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/american-muslims-may-face-backlash-in-wake-of-boston-
attacks, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/ODs59JDRqwq/].
214 Candice Ruud, Michael Russell, & Bryan Denson, Local Mosque Gets Support as
Oregon Muslims Fear Further Violence, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 30, 2010, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/local-mosque-gets-support n 790098.html, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/06o7BQblugY] (citing community concerns about additional
backlash after a local Mosque was burned following the arrest of a Somali American on
terrorism charges); Husna Haq, Boston Bombing: U.S. Muslims React with Fear,
Frustration, and New Resolve, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 25, 2013, http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2013/0425/Boston-bombing-US-Muslims-react-with-
fear-frustration-and-new-resolve, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0HP955WqLC2/]
(discussing the fears and backlash faced by the Muslim community following the Boston
Marathon bombings).
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Meanwhile, the government has deployed substantial resources to
infiltrate Muslim communities with informants and undercover agents; 215
monitor Muslims' online activity and social media communications; 216 and
implement an aggressive, preventive strategy that measures success by the
number of terrorist investigations and prosecutions. 217 Cumulatively, these
practices result in individual and communal self-censorship. 218 Muslims
become afraid to openly discuss political issues, much less vocally
disapprove of government policies.219 Robust and open debates on social
and political questions become glaringly absent.
More critically, Muslims are becoming suspicious of each other.220
They know there are informants in their midst, but they do not know who
they are. 221 To avoid getting caught in the government's counterterrorism
215 Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 655; see CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 26
(reporting that in 2007 and 2009, 71% of terrorism cases involved an informant).
216 See, e.g., Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All Over Northeast,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/
NYPD-monitored-Muslim-students-all-over-Northeast, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OPow9t8A7T5/] (reporting officers monitored student websites).
217 Selective enforcement of immigration and criminal laws against Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians was publicly announced soon after 9/11. For example, former Attorney
General Ashcroft stated, "You want any population that might be thinking about
committing a crime to be unsettled and distressed about it. So you have an elevated profile
of enforcement. There is going to be awareness in the community that we are going to ask
people to do that in such a way as to elevate a sense among those who would break the
law that this isn't the thing to do." Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft h Ascent, NEW YORKER, Apr.
15, 2002, at 53.
218 Ending Racial Profiling Hearings, supra note 206.
219 Arun Kundnani, Missing the Best Chance to Prevent Terror Bombing, CNN, May 7,
2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/opinion/kundnani-terror-mosques-surveillance/,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0qtqZRapQw7l].
220 Harris, supra note 5, at 166-67 (quoting a community leader admitting that news of an
informant in the community "brought mistrust among the brothers in the mosque");
Cincotta, supra note 206.
221 See Jerry Markon, Tension Grows Between Calif Muslims, FBI after Informant
Infiltrates MAosque, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403710.html?sid=ST2010120404317, [http://
pena.law.harvard.edu/OArE8USQFl/]; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help,
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dragnet, they limit or stop their attendance at mosques, 222 decline to donate
to Muslim charities and organizations, 223 and generally avoid association
with Muslims. 224 In the aggregate, Muslim civil society and community
development is significantly stunted as communities are impeded from fully
mobilizing their financial and human resources to empower themselves
politically, economically, and socially. 225 Consequently, they continue to be
a politically marginalized minority, which only perpetuates their
subordination. 226
In theory, community policing aims to create opportunities for
government and Muslim communities to work together to address the
aforementioned concerns as well as to assist law enforcement in combating
terrorism. In practice, however, community policing exacerbates the
subordinating effects of counterterrorism policies and practices by: (1)
dividing communities between "Good Muslims" and "Bad Muslims" based
on their willingness to accept community policing on the government's
terms; 227 and (2) deputizing community leaders as gatekeepers who share
information with law enforcement about Muslim community affairs as part
of a seemingly innocuous process. 228
222 See, e.g., Lynn Duke, Worship and Worry; At a Brooklyn Mosque, Muslims Pray in the
Shadow of Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2003, at C1; Warren Richey & Linda Feldman,
Has Post-911 Dragnet Gone Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 12, 2003, at 1
(quoting one community leader as saying that "[s]ome people are afraid to cite verses of
the Koran that include the word jihad' when leading prayers, because they think the
government is listening"); lfosque Attendance Falls After Terrorism Arrests, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (May 30, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10529148,
[http://penna.law.harvard.edu/04FiZoUkpBV].
223 See BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY, supra note 175.
224 Harris, supra note 5, at 167.
225 Cincotta, supra note 206.
226 See, e.g., id.
227 For a more in-depth analysis of how post-9/11 national security policies create "Good
Muslims" and "Bad Muslims," see Engle, supra note 166.
228 See Kundnani, supra note 79, at 20 (critiquing Britain's Preventing Violent Extremism
program as using community gatekeepers to persuade Muslim communities to cooperate
with the Prevent program by sharing information and refraining from criticizing foreign
policy). But see Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 695 (discussing how informants are
deployed to infiltrate African-American communities to purportedly save those
communities from criminals, which reduces the privacy interests of these communities in
pursuit of prosecutorial goals).
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1. Propping Up the Divisive "Good Muslim" and "Bad Muslim" Paradigm
The aftermath of the September 11th attacks created a "Good
Muslim/Bad Muslim" paradigm. 229 An individual willing to accept the
disproportionate curtailing of Muslims' civil liberties purportedly to protect
the national security of the majority is deemed a loyal, good citizen by the
government. 23 0 But those who demand equal protection under the law are
deemed treacherous agitators both within and outside Muslim
communities. 23 1 Indeed, the "Bad Muslims"' failure to cooperate with law
enforcement 23 2 and vociferous dissent becomes a form of transgression that
leads to government and public suspicions of Muslims as having something
to hide. Their participation in advocacy is associated with militant ethnics
who are racialized at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. 233 As such, Muslims
suspicious of government motives in community policing initiatives are
categorized as "Bad Muslims" whose skepticism is censured as a cause of
Muslims' radicalization post-9/11. 234 In contrast, the "Good Muslims"'
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement's CCP programs represents
their attempts to assimilate so they can return to their rightful place in the
White majority. 235
Demanding that the government rely heavily on empowering
specific Muslim organizations and individuals to provide counter-narratives
in theological debates comes dangerously close to state entanglement in
religion in what Sam Rascoff provocatively critiques as "establishing
official Islam." 236 Rascoff argues that the government's engagement with
Muslims goes beyond providing a political and public relations platform for
229 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR, AND
THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2005).
230 Engle, supra note 166, at 62-63.
231 Id.; Neil Gotanda, The Racialization of Islam in American Law, 637 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 184, 194 (2011); Rascoff, supra note 73, at 173.
232 Harris, supra note 5, at 140.
233 TEHRANIAN, supra note 155, at 83.
234 Id.
235 Id.; Gotanda, supra note 231, at 194; Kundnani, supra note 79, at 35-38 (showing how
Britain's Prevent program defines moderate Muslims as those who do not criticize British
policy and extremists as those who express dissenting political views coupled with
religious Salafi orthodoxy).
236 For a thorough and insightful critique of the government's potentially unconstitutional
entanglement with religion arising from countering violent extremism programs, see
Rascoff, supra note 73, at 162-66. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 8
(warning against government meddling in religious debates).
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select Muslim groups and individuals to speak out against terrorism, which
most organizations have done irrespective of their relationship with the
government, and comes problematically close to developing an official
version of American Islam palatable to the U.S. government. 23 7
Consequently, the government may be violating the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause-enacted to prevent politicization and exploitation of
religion.238 Rascoff's solution is to outsource counter-radicalization, under
the guise of outreach or community policing, to private, non-governmental
organizations. 239 As such, Muslim communities should lead efforts to make
it difficult for terrorist recruiters to cherry-pick their potentially vulnerable
youth. 240
Despite this seemingly benign approach, his recommendation still
results in the creation of an "official Islam" due to the coercive power of the
purse. With government funding, whether under the auspices of community
policing or community engagement, promotion of certain interpretations of
Islam will merely be effectuated through private, non-governmental actors.
As noted by Arun Kundnani's field work, Britain's Prevent program
demonstrates the perils of this flawed approach. 241 Muslim organizations in
Britain that accepted government funding in a good faith effort to protect
their youth from being exploited by terrorist recruiters found themselves
pressured to serve as providers of information to the police.242 Moreover,
237 But see Stevens, supra note 32, at 520-22 (showing that state sponsorship of churches
in Europe leads to lower attendance and radicalization of those that remain).
238 Rascoff, supra note 73, at 130.
239 Id. at 186-88; see also Beutel, supra note 30, at 21.
240 GREAT BRITAIN HoME OFFICE, supra note 79, at 69 ("Schools can help to protect
children from extremist and violent views in the same ways that they help to safeguard
children from drugs, gang violence or alcohol."); see Rascoff, supra note 73, at 186; see
also Beutel, supra note 30, at 18.
241 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 16 (critiquing Britain's Preventing Violent Extremism
program as imposing government agendas on local Muslim communities); Rascoff, supra
note 73, at fn. 125, 304 (noting work of the Quilliam foundation in Britain's Prevent
program); Rewriting the Narrative, supra note 44, at 5 (supporting the work of the non-
governmental Quilliam foundation in Britain, which receives government money to openly
challenge extremist groups).
242 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 6; Timothy Whiteman, Birmingham: Anti-terrorist
'Community Outreach' Plan Complete Failure, EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 23, 2013), http://
www.examiner.com/article/biningham-anti-terrorist-community-outreach-plan-complete-
failure, [http://pena.law.harvard.edu/0krwVc4zZMj] (criticizing Muslim community for
not informing police of defendants' travels to a training camp in Pakistan, but also
recognizing community for bringing defendants back to England only to be prosecuted).
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they censored criticism of the government out of fear of losing funding or
being labeled "extremists"-the very groups Muslim organizations sought
to marginalize from the Muslim communities. 243 As a result, a cadre of
interlopers and gatekeepers formed to discipline internal dissent, cooperate
with the government on the government's terms, and ultimately promote the
development of an "official Islam"-using the more politically correct term
"moderate Islam" 244-purportedly created indigenously within Muslim
communities. 245 Meanwhile, participating organizations were disappointed
with the government's disinterest in making structural reforms to policies
and practices that contributed to discrimination against Muslims. 246
Britain's experience is a cautionary note that outsourcing counter-
radicalization within a community policing model is likely to create a
government-funded "official Islam" that subordinates Muslim communities
into accepting a racialized counterterrorism paradigm.
While Rascoff's narrow critique of the First Amendment
implications is useful, it misses the mark in identifying the underlying
divergence of interests between Muslim communities and the federal
government within a structurally prosecution-driven counterterrorism
system. 247  As such, counter-radicalization programs reinforce a false
dichotomy between the "Good Muslims," who actively work with the
government to implement counter-radicalization programs (usually under
the guise of community outreach or engagement) on the government's
terms, 248 and "Bad Muslims," who criticize the discriminatory effects of
243 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 16.
244 Stevens, supra note 32.
245 Beutel, supra note 30, at 11.
246 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 17.
247 Setty, supra note 5, at 192 (discussing the realist political theory prediction that interests
of minority groups can be furthered only to the extent those interests are co-extensive with
the self-interest of the legislator); see generally Rascoff, supra note 73.
248 Much of the government's influence in propping up "good Muslims" is manifested in
private conversations among (predominantly male) Muslim leaders who invoke pragmatic
arguments to dissuade those deemed to be a problem by the government from being too
critical of the government lest they invite collective punishment against the entire
community. See Anti-CAIR, http://www.anti-cair-net.org/, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
OfrQDrqjPx] (site dedicated to counter-acting and speaking against CAIR, which it claims
is an organization founded by terrorists); Joseph Abrams, House Leaders Wary of CAIR
After FBI Shuns Islamic Advocacy Group, Fox NEWS, Feb. 3, 2009, http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/02/03/house-leaders-wary-cair-fbi-shuns-islamic-
advocacy-group/, [http://perma.law.harvard. edu/Ow7Gkbq5D6 1] (stating the FBI and
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counterterrorism practices, 2 49 refuse to engage with government unless on
terms that meaningfully protect civil rights and liberties, 25 0 vehemently
disagree with American foreign policy, and/or practice a stringent form of
Islam. 25 1 This co-opts Muslim communities through divide-and-conquer
tactics discussed in more detail in Part IV 25 2
Some well-meaning community leaders embrace community
policing, believing it will end negative government scrutiny manifested in
disproportionate surveillance, investigations, and prosecutions of
Muslims. 2 53 Supporters view community policing as an opportunity to
engage with law enforcement to communicate the communities' concerns
about systemic and individual violations of civil liberties and rights. 2 5 4 And,
they believe, by de-mystifying Muslims in the eyes of law enforcement,
civil liberties violations will consequently decrease. 2 5 5
But their optimism overlooks decades of subordination experienced
by other minority communities at the hands of the U.S. government.
Despite the passing of more than a hundred years since the end of slavery,
followed by decades of Jim Crow laws, African Americans are still
disproportionately prosecuted and incarcerated in America's criminal justice
several Congressional members believe CAIR has ties to terrorist organizations); see also
LYNCH, supra note 19, at 11 (noting the perceptions that community engagement is simply
counterterrorism in disguise).
249 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 35-38 (showing how Britain's Prevent program defines
moderate Muslims as those who do not criticize British policy and extremists as those who
express dissenting political views coupled with religious Salafi orthodoxy).
250 Samantha Henry, NJ Finds NYPD Muslim Surveillance is Legal, YAHOO NEWS, May 24,
2012, http://news.yahoo.com/ap-nj-finds-nypd-muslim-surveillance-legal-183326533.html,
[http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0cL2rAFfSzk].
251 Joseph Abrams, FBI Cuts Ties with CAIR Following Terror Financing Trial, Fox NEWS,
Jan. 30, 3009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/30/fbi-cuts-ties-cair-following-
terror-financing-trial/#ixzz2LNkBnjZc, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/OvrZeRQTWFP];
Scott Shane, CAIR on Hot Seat at Hearing on U.S. Muslims, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/us/politics/12muslims.html?_r=0, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OHmFhiW1D9n].
252 Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 317.
253 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing:
A Study ofMuslimAmericans, 44 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 365 (2010).
254 Alexis Taylor, Police Engage Faith Leaders in Crime Fight, AFRO (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.afro.com/sections/news/Baltimore/story.htm?storyid=77167, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OvcWXccY2sL]. See also Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note
121, at 1196.
255 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 253.
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system, adversely impacted by voter registration laws, and under-
represented in electoral politics. 256 Similarly, Asian Americans continue to
be stereotyped as the model minority whose national loyalties are
nonetheless suspect, 257 and their communities are essentialized as cutthroat
overachievers. 258 Latinos are presumed to be illegally in the United States,
notwithstanding many are descendants of families who lived in the
southwestern states prior to U.S. annexation. 259 As a result, aggressive
immigration enforcement targets Latino communities and devastates
hundreds of thousands of families. 260
To a large extent, these disparate results are a product of the same
racialized adversarial criminal justice system that applies to
counterterrorism. Thus, Muslims' belief that they are somehow immune
from the subordination experienced by other minority communities assumes
a fictional exceptionalism. 261 Indeed, the twelve years since the 9/11 attacks
show that Muslims in the United States are not only experiencing
subordination in various settings, but they also have been relegated to the
lower tier of the "racial hierarchy." 262 For example, the government targets
Muslims based on its assumption that certain national origins from which
there is an Al Qaeda presence are suspect for purposes of detention,
256 See Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 651, 692.
257 See Chon & Arzt, supra note 6, at 217 (discussing suspicions of Japanese Americans as
having a propensity for espionage and sabotage); Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8
THEORETICAL INQ. 571, 579 (2007); see, e.g., Bill Mears, Deal in Wen Ho Lee Case May
be Imminent, CNN, May 22, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/05/22/
scotus.wenholee/, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0KmTXbRg9Mw].
258 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" &Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World
War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 11 (1996)
(discussing connotations of "model minority" myth, including that Asian Americans
assimilate well and are aggressive over-achievers); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The
"Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 55 (1994).
259 Kevin Johnson, The Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 685-88 (2000).
260 Ashar, supra note 15.
261 M.A. Muqtader Khan, American Exceptionalism andAmerican Muslims, 10 REV. FAITH
& INT'L AFFS. 59-65 (2012) (describing some American Muslims' belief that they are set
apart from the greater Muslim community in a positive way).
262 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" As We Know It?:
Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1481 (2002);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" ofArab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001); Natsu Taylor Saito,
Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American
Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997).
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deportation, interrogation, and exclusion from the United States. 263 Their
targeted status fuses national origin, religion, and race such that an Arab,
Middle Easterner, or Muslim is presumed to be a terrorist or affiliated with
terrorists. 264 As aptly noted by Leti Volpp, the consequence is a near
impossibility "to separate who is likely to engage in terrorism from
assumptions about that person's race, religion, and national origin." 265
The government uses community outreach and CCP to manipulate
these intracommunity divisions. It promotes Muslims seeking to return to
their perceived pre-9/11 White privileged status and thus willing to support
engagement with government to prove their loyalty, regardless of its
efficacy. Meanwhile, Muslims who engage only on terms that protect the
communities' civil rights and produce tangible policy reforms are ostracized
as troublemakers. 266 Manipulation of the "Good Muslim/Bad Muslim"
paradigm is facilitated by entrapment laws and internal investigative
guidelines, which favor the government. 267 The government, therefore, is
able to wield significant power, in comparison to politically powerless
Muslim communities, 268 to persuade some Muslims that cooperating and
sharing information is in their best interest. 269
2. Deputizing Community Leaders to Gather Intelligence on Muslims
While law enforcement should seek information directly related to a
known terrorist plot, law enforcement continues to seek information about
lawful activities that facilitate their mapping of Muslim mosques,
263 See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 257, at 581; Ashar, supra note 15, at 1188 (noting the
author's client was arrested for discernible reason other than the fact he was brown-
skinned, Muslim, and present at a Brooklyn mosque at the time of INS sweep).
264 See generally Aziz, supra note 174; Ibrahim, supra note 173.
265 Volpp, supra note 257, at 582.
266 See Tehranian, supra note 174, at 1229.
267 Harris, supra note 5, at 141-68.
268 Id., at 186 (admitting that law enforcement has little incentive to keep promises to
restrain its authorities because the law grants it the power to do as it pleases). See also
Gurpreet Mahajan, Multiculturalism in the Age of Terror: Confronting the Challenges, 5
POL. STUD. REV. 317, 325 (2007) (arguing that minorities must constitute a certain
percentage of the population in order for their interests to be advanced since only then will
they be able to "tilt the balance in favour of or against a political party").
269 See, e.g., German, supra note 123.
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community organizations, student organizations, and leadership. 270 Thus,
CCP is about more than stopping terrorist plots, which occurs without CCP
as Muslim communities have the same public safety interest in stopping
terrorism as any other community. 271 Rather, community policing offers law
enforcement access to personal and detailed information about Muslim
communities' affairs without the political risk of untrained informants being
discovered or going rogue. 272 But as law enforcement solicits information
from Muslims, officers still send informants into communities in search of
existing plots and at times concoct plots with mentally unstable young men
with radical political views. 273 Cooperating community leaders are then
used to legitimize CCP and assist with crisis management when law
enforcement is caught abusing rights caused by underlying counterterrorism
strategies. 274
Informants have been a critical tool for combating organized crime,
drug dealing, and gangs. 275  However, the use of informants in
counterterrorism has increased at a troubling rate since 9/11.276 Compared to
270 See NYPD's Muslim mapping project where police were tasked to "[ildentify and map
ethnic residential concentrations within the Tri-State area," "[ildentify and map ethnic hot
spots," and "Monitor current events," NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, Powerpoint,
available at http://demographicsunited.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/nypd-powerpoint-
racism.pdf; see also Racial Mapping: The Secret Behind the FB~s Invasive Program,
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 13, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/racial-
mapping-fbi-secret-program n 2679367.html, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
ObYjNVZNNSb]; Richard Winton, Teresa Watanabe & Greg Krikorian, LAPD Defends
Muslim Mapping Effort, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-
me-lapdl0nov10,0,3960843.story, [http://penna.cc/E77G-DP33]; Associated Press, supra
note 190; PRICE, supra note 5, at 7-8.
271 See, e.g., Steve Benen, Meet Aliou Niasse, WASH. MONTHLY, May 5, 2010, http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2010_05/023656.php, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/nOcuKNpZv93] (profiling Muslim who reported Times Square
bombers to police).
272 Cincotta, supra note 206 (discussing Craig Monteih case); Natapoff, supra note 13, at
645, 649.
273 See Jean-Paul Brodeur, High and Low Policing in Post-911 Times, 1 POLICING 25, 35
(2007); see CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 26 (reporting that in 2007 and 2009,
71% of terrorism cases involved an informant); Associated Press, supra note 190 (noting
the FBI's concern that its informant was entrapping a young Muslim male target who was
mentally unstable).
274 Cincotta, supra note 206.
275 Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 661.
276 E.g., Cincotta, supra note 206; but see Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 656 (noting that
nearly every drug case involves an informant, making informants a staple of the War on
Drugs).
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1,500 informants in 1975 and 2,800 in 1980, investigative reports indicate
that there are now approximately 15,000 FBI paid informants, whose tasks
are driven to a large extent by racial and religious profiling. 277 Many of the
informants are explicitly tasked to spy on and infiltrate American Arab and
Muslim communities. 278
For example, the New York Police Department ("NYPD") sent
agents and informants to New York City mosques, restaurants, and other
Muslim-owned businesses viewed as "security risks" for "endorsing
conservative religious views or having devout customers." 279 The NYPD
explicitly used "ethnic orientation, leadership and group affiliations" to
mark fifty-three "mosques of concern." 280 According to the Associated
Press, the documents "paint the clearest picture yet of how the past decade's
hunt for terrorists also put huge numbers of innocent people under scrutiny
as they went about their daily lives in mosques, restaurants, and social
groups." 281 When coupled with multiple discoveries that informants have
induced young Muslim men with diminished mental capacity or financial
problems toward violence, it should come as no surprise that some Muslim
communities are distrustful of state and federal law enforcement agencies'
overtures to engage in community policing. 28 2 Indeed, some community
277 Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-infonnants, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/
OMsNufEoiph]; see also Ten Years After 911 Hearings, supra note 19 (testifying that
"[wlith the expanded national security mission, the need for and value of [human
intelligence] in understanding our adversaries and developing the threat picture has
increased significantly").
278 Harris, supra note 5, at 140.
279 Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 53; see Larry Neumeister & Eileen
Sullivan, NYPD Defends Spying on Muslims for Terror Threats, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4,
2013, http://www.pottsmerc.com/article/20130204/NEWS04/130209748/nypd-defends-
spying-on-muslims-for-terror-threats?mobredirect= true#full story, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OapoLhyFJHw].
280 Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 53 (referencing 2006 NYPD documents).281 Id.
282 See, e.g., Samantha Henry, NJ FBI: NYPD Monitoring Damaged Public Trust,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NJ-
FBI-NYPD-monitoring-damaged-public-trust, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OxcSNxag39h] ("The monitoring of Muslims in Newark and across the state has damaged
the public's trust in New Jersey law enforcement and jeopardized some of the relationships
agents had sought to build in the community since 9/11, said Michael Ward, agent in charge
of the FBI's Newark division.").
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members suspect community policing is a means of recruiting Muslims as
informants, whether for pay or based on informal relationships.283
Even if such suspicions are misplaced, something more insidious
may be occurring. Under the guise of collaboration and relationship-
building in community policing, community leaders are more likely to
provide information about their communities' lawful activities than would
otherwise be available to law enforcement. 28 4 As law enforcement officials
develop personal relationships with community leaders, they are able to
exploit those relationships to solicit detailed information about Muslim
communities. 285 The information is added to intelligence databases, used to
map communities, or used for prosecutorial purposes without the
community leaders' knowledge. In effect, the community leader becomes an
unwitting informant.28 6  Thus, community policing normalizes and de-
stigmatizes invasion of the privacy of peaceful Muslim communitieS28 7 by
reframing it as benign "information sharing" between law enforcement and
their constituents. 288
283 Associated Press, supra note 190; Innes, supra note 117, at 232 (noting that community
engagement units are often established to develop a "community intelligence feed" about
communities of interest to the police). See also, Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD
Designates Mosques as Terrorism Organizations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 28, 2013, http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/nypd-designates-mosques-terrorism-organizations, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/ObevvKEUuKA].
284 See JUDE MCCULLOCH, BLUE ARMY: PARAMILITARY POLICING IN VICTORIA (2001).
285 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 7 (citing meetings with Muslim leaders just before
arrest in terrorism plot as evidence of effectiveness of community outreach/policing).
286 "We're spending more money on outreach ... so we can say: 'Please help us. Please
look for people who are turning away from institutions of extremism. Please be our eyes
and ears." Karen DeYoung, Distrust Hinders FBI in Outreach to Muslims, WASH. POST.,
Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/
AR2007020702314pf.html, [http://perma.cc/AA9X-DK7R] (quoting Philip Mudd,
Deputy Dir of the FBI's Nat'l Sec. Branch); see also Cincotta, supra note 206; Lininger,
supra note 61, at 1231 (highlighting the FBI's bad faith in claiming the mapping of
mosques is to protect Muslims from hate crimes rather than set targets for surveillance and
investigation).
287 For a critique of the adverse impact of snitching on racial minority communities, see
Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645.
288 Raymond Kelly, Safeguarding Citizens and Civil Liberties, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 555
(2006) (highlighting the importance of information sharing in a post-9/11 world); Murray,
supra note 7, at 347, 357 (noting that community policing works best when structured to
encourage information sharing from the community); HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY
COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 20.
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Such concerns came to light when the NYPD engaged in
community outreach programs to purportedly build relationships of trust
with Muslim communities while simultaneously engaging in mass
surveillance of Muslim college students across the East Coast, mosques in
the Tri-State area, and Muslim-owned businesses. 289 In 2007, the NYPD
had at least twenty employees liaising with Muslim communities to "make
inroads and foster trust in the city's kaleidoscopic and widening sea of
immigrants, many of them distrustful of the police." 29 0 It also hired two
Muslim civilians as liaisons "to do outreach and to train the department's
officers in matters of cultural sensitivity." 291 Around the same time, the
NYPD reported weekly on activities of Muslim Student Association
("MSA") activities at universities on the East Coast.292 The reports detailed
events sponsored by MSAs, biographies of Muslim speakers, and contents
of presentations at the monitored events. 293 It produced weekly intelligence
reports documenting conversations that confidential informants and
undercover agents had with Muslim congregants at mosques and the
contents of sermons. 294 These mass surveillance efforts were ongoing when
the Associated Press published a series of investigative reports exposing the
extent of the NYPD's mass surveillance of Muslim communities. 295
Presumably, these activities remain ongoing, as suggested by a lawsuit filed
by Muslims alleging that the NYPD's selective and mass surveillance of
289 See generallyAP ' Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations, supra note 53.
290 Cara Buckley, New York City Police Seek Trust Among Immigrants, N.Y TIMES, May
31, 2007, http://www.nytime s.com/2007/0 5/3 1/nyregion/3 l outreach.html?
pagewanted=print, [http://perma.cc/S59Y-SNJX]; Neumeister & Sullivan, supra note 279.
291 Buckley, supra note 290.
292 Hawley, supra note 216.
293 NYPD, Weekly MSA Report (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/
interactives/documents/nypd-msa-report.pdf.
294 Neumeister & Sullivan, supra note 279 (explaining civil rights lawyers' request that
judge stop NYPD from routinely observing Muslims in restaurants, bookstores and
mosques); NYPD, Secret Intelligent Note (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/
specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypdplanecrash.pdf; Harris, supra note 5, at 138.
295 Tom Hays, Undercover Cop Unraveled NJ Terror Plot, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 8,
2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/undercover-cop-
unraveled n 604094.html (undercover Muslim officer one of 1,000 officers assigned to
NYPD counterterrorism duty, including a cadre of undercovers on assignments deep within
Muslim communities).
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mosques, Muslim-owned businesses, and Muslim student associations
violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.296
The circumstances surrounding information sharing in CCP,
therefore, cannot be ignored. Since 9/11, an elaborate network of
intelligence databases at the local, state, and federal level has been created
to store petabytes of information purportedly related to national security.297
Much of this information comes from heightened scrutiny of Muslim
individuals, mosques, and Muslim communities' affairs as part of the
preventive counterterrorism strategy. Indeed, fusion centers in Texas and
Missouri were discovered to be creating "suspicious activity reports" that
concluded that Muslim civil rights organizations and civic activities pose a
potential threat to national security.298 Similarly, mosques in New York City,
Orange County, Albany, and other locales have discovered they are under
296 First Amended Complaint, Hassan et al. v. City of New York, 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-
MCA (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2012), available at https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
muslimadvocates/pages/216/attachments/original/1363890067/10 FIRST VAMENDED
COMPLAINT.pdf?1363890067; see also Complaint, Raza v. City of New York, No. 1:13-
cv-03448 (E.D.N.Y Jun 18, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/
raza-v-city-new-york-complaint (which the ACLU and CLEAR filed in June 2013 with
similar claims).
297 See Federal Government Intelligence Sharing with State, Local and Tribal Law
Enforcement: An Assessment Ten Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the Subcomm on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. of Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/intelligence-sharing-with-federal-state-
and-local-law-enforcement-10-years-after-9- 11, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
jsnk9Am9cg] (statement of Eric Velez-Villar, Assistant Dir., Directorate of Intelligence,
FBI) (testifying "we also recognize that the violent extremism threat may be first identified
within our communities by state, local, or tribal law enforcement. As a result, we have
taken numerous proactive steps in the past year to develop a more robust information
sharing capacity with all federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners"); Kelly,
supra note 288, at 558; Editorial Board, Too Many Government Secrets, WASH. POST, Dec.
25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/too-many-government-documents-are-
kept-secret/2012/12/25/ee9a922c-449e-11e2-8e70-el993528222dstory.html, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OZVs5ciRi7K]. See generally PRICE, supra note 5 (describing the
development of fusion centers and JTTFs, and the variable and generally irrelevant data
they have gathered).
298 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & Gov'T AFF., supra note 72, at 3-4, 27 (noting that the work of fusion
centers appears to have violated the civil liberties of many U.S. citizens, has not produced
successful counterterrorism results, and cost between $289 million and $1.4 billion in
federal funds from 2003-2011); R. Jeffrey Smith, Senate Report Says National Intelligence
Fusion Centers have been Useless, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 3, 2012), http://
www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/03/11063/senate-report-says-national-intelligence-fusion-
centers-have-been-useless, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/09v7cDvZLdZ] ("warning" sent
regarding a Muslim organization's "lecture on positive parenting").
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surveillance by undercover agents and paid informants. 299  But for
investigative reports or inadvertent leaks, none of this would be privy to the
public. Against this highly secretive backdrop of pervasive intelligence
gathering, it is reasonable to assume information shared with law
enforcement in CCP will be used for intelligence and prosecutorial
purposes.
Thus, the extensive network of relationships built through
community policing under the guise of building relationships of trust is an
alternative means of collecting such information that decreases the risks and
costs of hiring ex-felon informants with questionable motives.3 00 Though
decreasing the use of shady informants may appear to benefit targeted
communities, paid informants will simply be replaced with community
members, some of whom may be cognizant of their intelligence-gathering
role while many others are unwitting or naively oblivious.3 01 So long as
racialized counterterrorism practices remain unchanged, replacing paid
informants with community leaders only compounds the additional group
harm by legitimizing subordinating counterterrorism strategies.3 02
B. Counter-Critiques and the Rhetoric ofEmpowerment
Champions of community policing proffer the counter-critique that
CCP can be leveraged to change government practices to protect
communities' rights and prevent intrusive, "hard" counterterrorism
tactics.3 03 They seek to empower communities to counter violent extremism
using gentler tactics while leaving counterterrorism to law enforcement, as
if the two are separate and distinct. While most supporters are well
intentioned, I argue that these proposals not only fail to stop government
abuses, they actually worsen subordination of Muslims by creating a false
299 See AP ' Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations, supra note 53; Trevor Aaronson,
supra note 277.
300 Natapoff, supra note 13, at 645, 651-54; see Harris, supra note 5, at 177 (admitting that
the FBI, NYPD, and other law enforcement groups want Muslim communities' cooperation
for the purposes of gathering intelligence); BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 10-11.
301 Beutel, supra note 30, at 20.
302 See, e.g., Henry, supra note 282 (discussing an FBI official's claim that NYPD spying
made Muslims "more hesitant to reach out to law enforcement and less trusting").
303 HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4; Murray, supra note 7, at 359; Patel,
supra note 107, at 26-27; Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust
(July 2010), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/
e071021293_buildingcommtrust-revision.pdf.
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sense of progress. Moreover, I challenge the underlying assumption that
countering violent extremism and counterterrorism are distinct practices. To
the contrary, the former is a preventive component that serves the latter.
As discussed above in Part II, community policing is the new,
politically expedient term used to describe counter-radicalization and
countering violent extremism, which are as integral to counterterrorism as
surveillance, investigations, and criminal prosecutions. And absent the
coercive power of the courts or political pressure, law enforcement has little
incentive to change its current counterterrorism strategies. Indeed,
implementation of current "hard on terror" strategies has led to promotions,
public recognition, and more votes for law enforcement officers,
notwithstanding the significant adverse consequences to Muslim
communities' rights.304
Nevertheless, the counter-critiques in support of community
policing warrant consideration. 305  Whether analyzed under the
nomenclature of counter-radicalization, community engagement, countering
violent extremism, or community policing, proponents make four key
arguments in favor of CCP: (1) CCP demystifies and de-vilifies Muslims to
officers whose minimal knowledge of Islam is most likely negative; (2)
CCP de-securitizes relationships between government and Muslim
communities; (3) CCP allows communities to internally police their
members from terrorist recruitment using "softer" methods that direct
targeted youth to mental health and other social services; 306 and (4) CCP
empowers communities to push for incremental improvements in
policies.307  Notwithstanding the plausibility of these arguments, they
address the symptoms of, rather than offer solutions to, counterterrorism
304 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Attorney General Holder Recognizes DOJ
Employees and Others for Their Service at Annual Awards Ceremony (Oct. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-ag-1207.html, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/OcVAti6Leg8].
305 Harris, supra note 5, at 181 (discussing the perceptions by Muslims that law
enforcement does not play fair in pursuit of a conviction).
306 See Terrorism and Our Youth, ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP INST. OF AM. (Feb. 2, 2013),
available at http://us1.campaign-archive2.com/?u=5753262cf6639155beda2cc01&id=
4d8cc56c90&e=ccaf327259, [http://penna.cc/8BTD-XA64].
307 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 7 (discussing community empowerment and
engagement without clear definitions of either).
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strategies that disproportionately burden Muslim communities' collective
civil liberties.308
1. De-Mystify Muslims and Counter Negative Stereotypes
Since the September 11th attacks, numerous scholars have
examined how Muslims have become racialized as the "Terrorist Other" in
the minds of many Americans. 309 Their otherwise American expressions of
dissent or civil grievances are viewed through the lens of disloyalty or
ingratitude. 310 Foreign cultural practices are suspected as subversive and as
signals of their unwillingness to assimilate into a Western liberal
democracy. 311 And the bad acts of a few are imputed to the millions of
Muslims in America by virtue of their shared faith.312 This is so not only
because the tenets of Islam are misinterpreted by the public, but also
because Muslims' loyalty to their religion is presumed to be irreconcilable
with any loyalty to the United States. 313 If forced to choose, it is supposed,
Muslims will choose their religion.314
The reification of these stereotypes in counterterrorism occurs
through selective enforcement against Muslim individuals and
communities. Prosecutions produce a list of Muslim defendants announced
in media sources, which serves to reinforce the stereotypes and calls for
308 See Ashar, supra note 15, at 1193.
309 E.g., Ibrahim, supra note 173, at 124-29; Volpp, supra note 6, passim.
310 Ibrahim, supra note 173, at 142.
" Id. at 142-43.
312 Id.; Salina Kahn, LETTER: Media Stereotypes All Muslims as Violent, MURFREESBORO
POST, May 9, 2013, http://www.murfreesboropost.com/letter-media-stereotypes-all-
muslims-as-violent-cms-35463, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0KVvSgncZT]; The
American Double Standard on Religious Violence, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (May 2,
2013), available at http://publicreligion.org/research/graphic-of-the-week/the-american-
double-standard-on-religious-violence/#.UYbsQgvT5.twitter, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/07YR2um7SWv] (finding that 44% of polled Americans believe
that "When people claim to be Muslim and commit acts of violence in the name of Islam
that they really are Muslim" compared to 13% of polled Americans who believed that
"people who claim to be Christian and commit acts of violence in the name of
Christianity . . . really are Christian"); see also After Boston, Little Change in Views of
Islam and Violence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 7, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/
2013/05/07/after-boston-little-change-in-views-of-islam-and-violence/1/, [http://
perma.law.harvard.edu/Ooj4DHHRaGM/] (42% of poll participants indicated a belief that
Islam is more likely to promote violent acts than other religions).
313 Ibrahim, supra note 173, at 143.
3Id.
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heightened scrutiny of Muslim communities.315 And the cycle continues and
expands as more resources are injected into the counterterrorism regime.316
For some Muslims, escape from this quagmire lies in engaging with law
enforcement to educate them that Muslims are in fact not as prone to
terrorism or disloyalty as they are made out to be. By initiating interactions
at the individual level with U.S. Attorneys, FBI agents, DHS officials,
immigration prosecutors, and others with law enforcement authority,
proponents of community policing hope to de-mystify Muslims and directly
dispel negative stereotypes. 317 They leverage these relationships to offer
alternative, more accurate sources of information to influence law
enforcement training, 318  intelligence gathering, and the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. By going to the belly of the beast and offering
partnership and assistance, proponents believe they can change the very
nature of the beast.
According to proponents of CCP, if only law enforcement "gets to
know" Muslim communities through community policing programs, then
government officials will realize that their current counterterrorism tactics
are misguided. 319  By building personal relationships with federal
prosecutors, FBI agents, DHS officials, and local police, Muslim
communities will eventually persuade law enforcement to stop sending
informants into their communities, spying on Muslims, issuing secret
National Security Letters, and engaging in other civil liberties violations.
CCP supporters believe engagement with law enforcement will free
315 See id. at 144 (discussing performative cues of "Terrorist Other" including surnames);
see generally Wadie Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REv. 687 (2010).
316 See Ten Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note 19 (noting that in the first year after 9/11,
the FBI added almost 2,000 agents to its national security programs).
3 See Harris, supra note 5, at 183-84.
318 Id. (recommending that Muslims educate law enforcement about social and religious
customs and habits of language to avoid innocent behavior being mistaken as indicia of
crime).
319 See, e.g., Hussain, supra note 15, at 940-41 (noting some Muslims' belief that civic
engagement can improve Americans' views of the Muslim community); Harris, supra note
5, at 162. The key issue is not to make law enforcement more friendly or polite as it
enforces a subordinating counterterrorism strategy, but rather to change the strategy to stop
subordinating communities. See Murray, supra note 7, at 357 (noting that community
policing helps "deflect rumors and reduce misinformation" between police and the
communities).
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Muslims of their suspect community status.3 20 But CCP's proponents'
optimism assumes that the government comes to the table in good faith,
willing to make systemic changes to its counterterrorism practices that may
subject it to political censure as "soft on terror."
While these engagement efforts mitigate some harm, they
ultimately fail to change the counterterrorism strategy and tactics that cause
the stigmatizing group harm. On the one hand, when Muslim communities
discovered law enforcement was receiving training from anti-Muslim
individuals without any expertise on Islam, they were relatively successful
in obtaining the U.S. Justice Department's commitment to restructure law
enforcement to hire objectively qualified experts that provided accurate
information, rather than stereotype-perpetuating propaganda. 321 But hiring
competent trainers for law enforcement should not be mistaken as
meaningful counterterrorism reform of selective enforcement of
surveillance, investigation, and prosecution based on the religion and
politics of the target. And yet, leaders of this campaign touted their pre-
existing good relations with law enforcement as dispositive of their success,
thereby calling for increased engagement between Muslim communities and
law enforcement. 322  On the other hand, the case of the NYPD
simultaneously engaging and spying tellingly exposes the minimal incentive
law enforcement has to deliver on promises to change counterterrorism
practices. Fully cognizant that Muslim communities are subject to negative
320 See, e.g., Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note 121. But see Kundnani, supra note
79, at 8 (finding that "the Prevent programme, in effect, constructs the Muslim population
as a 'suspect community', fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between
Muslims and others, [and] encourages tokenism").
321 E.g., Niraj Warikoo, FBI Ditches Training Materials Criticized as Anti-Muslim, USA
TODAY, Feb. 20, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-20/fbi-
anti-muslim-training/53168966/1, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0mgWEGz4qVY].
322 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, FBI Purges Hundreds of Terrorism Documents in
Islamophobia Probe, WIRED, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/
hundreds-fbi-documents-muslims/, [http://penna.law.harvard.edu/0PkaQeeq24Z] (quoting
Rev. C. Welton Gaddy of Interfaith Alliance: "[FBI] Director Mueller acknowledged the
seriousness of our concerns and expressed a commitment to maintaining contact with the
inter-religious community"). But see Adam Serwer, Muslim Groups: FBI Response to
Islamophobia Scandal Not Good Enough, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 28, 2011, http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/09/fbi-response-islamophobia-scandal, [http://
penna.law.harvard.edu/ORYWNnoYqwW] (quoting Abed Ayoub, the legal director of the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: "Why did [the FBI] not ask for the
community's advice on the [training material]? Why didn't they use the resources at their
disposal? ... There was no outreach done. That's disappointing").
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public stereotypes and possess little electoral power, law enforcement can
do as it chooses in counterterrorism with little regard for Muslim
communities' grievances.3 23  Most likely, community policing will not
change this reality. It may instead make it easier to co-opt Muslim
communities into the existing counterterrorism strategy and further
legitimize it.324
2. De-Securitize Relationships Between Law Enforcement and Muslim
Communities
Critics of government engagement programs with Muslim
communities rightfully point to an over-securitization of these communities.
Securitization occurs when the motive for engagement or providing services
is tied to preventing terrorism, even if in addition to serving other
purposes. 325 Somali communities in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and other cities,
for example, have been under intense government scrutiny for alleged ties
to Al-Shabab. 326  This designated terrorist group in Somalia recruited
approximately twenty American young men to fight in the Somali civil
war.327 This led to a spike in indictments for material support of terrorism
charges against individuals who provided humanitarian aid to Somalia, 328 as
323 See, e.g., Editorial, Spying on Law-Abiding Muslims, N.Y TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2013, http://
www. nytimes.com/2013/02/1 0/opinion/sunday/spying-on-law-abiding-muslim-
citizens.html? r-0, [http://penna.cc/5BZD-VKDN] (reporting that the NYPD considered
being a religious Muslim an indicator of terrorism).
324 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 9; Setty, supra note 5, at 213-14 (arguing that
quelling discontent among Muslim communities would encourage buy-in of U.S.
counterterrorism policies from Muslim communities and encourage Muslim communities
to participate in government counter-radicalization efforts).
325 Beutel, supra note 30, at 17; Rascoff, supra note 73, at 172.
326 See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 24 (showing high numbers of cases alleging
material support to Al-Shabab and focus on Minneapolis and California followed by other
states where there are Somali communities); Rupa Shenoy, Some Minnesota Somalis Fear
Indictments Could Hamper Legitimate Donations, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS, Aug. 9, 2010,
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/08/09/local-somalis-fear-donations-
hampered, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0flprHib6ba].
327 Eric Schmitt, Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War, Not Jihad,
N.Y TIMEs, June 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/0 7 /nyregion/0 7 shabaab.html?
src=mv&_r-0, [http://perma.cc/A4KZ-EAMM].
328 See Somali Women Humanitarian Workers Convicted on 'Terrorism' Charges, FIGHT
BACK NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.fightbacknews.org/2011/10/20/somali-women-
humanitarian-workers-convicted-terrorism-charges, [http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
OmmYD6M8aFb] ("[T]wo Somali American women who raised money for charities
assisting Somalia's poor, were found guilty of providing material support to foreign
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well as those allegedly seeking to participate in the fighting in Somalia
among the various warlords.3 29 Indeed, a Somali-American woman who
raised funds in the amount of $1,450 allegedly for humanitarian aid
purposes in Somalia found herself ensnared in the government's aggressive
material support prosecutions.33 0 This scorched-earth strategy may have had
a severe chilling effect that deters many Somalis in the United States from
having connections with Somalia notwithstanding the dire economic
circumstances of their extended families caught in a devastating civil war.331
When confronted with criticism of expanding the scope of counterterrorism
to conflicts that do not involve the United States, such as a civil war in
Somalia, the government responds that it must preventively prosecute these
Somali-American young men because they may eventually be co-opted by
Al Qaeda operatives to engage in homegrown terrorism. 332
Thus, when the Department of Homeland Security's Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the FBI's Specialized Community
Outreach Team sought to include the Department of Health and Human
Services in their engagement outreach program in Minneapolis and Seattle,
where large Somali populations reside, they did so for purposes of
decreasing the number of potential terrorist recruits-not solely to provide
social services. 333 CRCL's engagement strategy implicitly assumes Somalis
in Minneapolis are more prone to join terrorist groups based on the cases in
2008 and 2009 of young men traveling to Somalia allegedly to join Al-
Shabab. 334
terrorist organizations."); CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 19 (noting that since
2007, material support has gone from being charged in 11.6% of cases to 69.4% in 2010).
329 Schmitt, supra note 327.
330 Elliot Spagat, Somali Woman Gets Prison for Terror Support, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
11, 2012, http://bigstoiy.ap.org/article/somali-woman-gets-prison-terror-support, [http://
penna.cc/L93T-26ZF].
3 Monica Davey, Somali Community in U.S. Fears New Wave of Stigma After Kenya
Attack, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/somali-
community-in-us-fears-new-wave-of-stigma-after-kenya-attack.html, [http://penna.cc/
AGY4-YEPZ]; contra Shenoy, supra note 326.
332 CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 4-5; Nine Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note
110.
3 Nine Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note 110.
34 Peter Bergen & Bruce Hoffman, ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT: A REPORT OF THE
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GROUP 10 (Sept. 10,
2010), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%/ 20Final%/ 20Threat
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Muslim leaders calling for a shift to community policing believe
they can continue engagement while de-securitizing the relationship
between Muslim communities and law enforcement.335 As a result, the basis
for interaction will not always be related to preventing terrorism or
prosecuting terrorist suspects. Instead, Muslim communities will be treated
like any other community in need of certain government services that may
or may not impact counterterrorism. These Muslim leaders believe that by
shifting the government-community interactions under the rubric of
community policing, the common interests will lie in general public safety,
employment training, preventing youth delinquency, supporting new
immigrants, quality health care, quality education, providing refugees with
needed assistance, and other social services. Proponents accept countering
terrorism as one of the purposes of community policing, to the extent gang
prevention would be such a purpose for African-American or Latino
communities participating in community policing, but they do not believe
counterterrorism to be the primary or sole purpose.33 6
The problem with this reasoning is twofold. First, community
policing in counterterrorism is driven by federal agencies that use local
agencies' advantage of having boots on the ground in their respective
jurisdictions. 337 Muslims' political power is weakest at the federal level, as
they constitute less than seven percent of the national electorate. 338 In
%20Assessment.pdf; CRCL Engages with Somali-American Communities in the Twin
Cities, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/crcl-engages-
somali-american-communities-twin-cities, [http://penna.cc/0HyDZv8iiqP].
3 Michael Hirsch, Stopping Terrorism at the Source, NAT'L J., May 2, 2013, http://
www.nationaljournal. com/magazine/stopping-terrorism-at-the-source-20 130502?
print=true, [http://perma.cc/0ZNVRzo9yrA].
336 Beutel, supra note 30, at 17 (recommending that the government should "leave the
counter-radicalization to Muslim communities").
3 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE
EVIDENCE 49 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (estimating there are
approximately 13,500 local police departments across the country); Matthew. C. Waxman,
Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism
After 9/11, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 377, 386 (2009) available at http://jnslp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/09_Waxman-Master-12-7-09-.pdf, [http://perma.cc/
05BcoCRKAmH] (noting there are approximately 730,000 full-time police officers
compared to 13,000 FBI special agents).
338 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, How the Faithful Voted: 2012 Preliminary
Analysis, PEW RES. CTR., Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/
How-the-Faithful-Voted-2012 -Preliminary-Exit-Poll-Analysis.aspx, [http://perma.cc/
OGQxDvfExo7] (reporting Muslims and members of other non-Christian faiths accounted
for seven percent of the electorate in the 2012 national election).
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contrast, traditional community policing is driven and implemented by local
law enforcement that has political incentives to empower communities in
ways not directly related to crime.33 9 For instance, in the 1990s, in cities
like Chicago, Houston, and New York, local politicians were beholden to
African-American voters who demanded civil rights protections from
historically abusive police. 340 Those who ignored calls for community
policing that reformed abusive police practices and increased public safety
in predominantly minority communities risked their political careers. 341 As
such, police chiefs reporting to mayors had powerful incentives to
implement community policing in ways that better served communities as
opposed to merely co-opting them into a pre-existing subordinating
model. 342 That is not to say that these same minority communities were not
harmed by broader criminal justice policies and practices that collectively
subordinated their communities, such as crack-cocaine sentencing
disparities, racial disparities in the death penalty, and racial profiling, to
name just a few. 343 But at the local level, communities had sufficient voting
power, access to the media, and access to local politicians to ensure
community policing served many of their needs. 344
The same does not apply to Muslims in the counterterrorism
context. The Muslim population of disproportionately first- or second-
generation immigrants comprises only 2.6 million of the over 350 million
people in America, and therefore, has little political power to influence
federal policies and practices-the locus of counterterrorism strategy
339 Associated Press, Community Policing, CAPS Changes on the Way for Chicago, ABC
Loc.-CHI., Jan. 8, 2013, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/
local&id=8946091, [http://penna.cc/OpnpnLj2ojv]; Building Community Trust, NORMAN
TRANSCRIPT (Jan. 11, 2013), http://nonantranscript.com/opinion/xl746077382/Building-
community-trust, [http://penna.cc/0JsVC38wb5k].
340 Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of
Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES
3, 12, 27 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, eds., 1999).
341 Mears & Kahan, supra note 340, at 12, 27; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
337, at 59.
342 Associated Press, supra note 341; Building Community Trust, supra note 339.
343 Ramirez, Hoopes, & Quinlan, supra note 121, at 1197.
344 Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEW RES. CTR., May 22,
2007, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/05/22/muslim-americans-middle-
class-and-mostly-mainstream/, [http://pena.cc/OWAYVt837yW].
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development.3 45 That is not to say they are completely powerless or unable
to advocate for their rights, as shown in the case of law enforcement
trainings and prosecution of hate crimes.346 However, the little they have
been able to accomplish is narrowly limited to symptomatic individual
cases defending the most egregious civil rights violations without affecting
counterterrorism strategy and tactics that collectively subordinate them.
Second, community policing does not challenge the
counterterrorism paradigm; it accommodates it. The exclusive focus on
Muslim communities, as opposed to community policing in a particular
geography where certain social services are most needed, reinforces that
Muslims are a suspect community. 347 Nor does community policing affect
the federal laws that grant the government nearly unfettered discretion to
spy on Muslim communities. 348  And history has proven that law
enforcement will use its authority to the fullest in furtherance of an
345 Cathy Lynn Grossman, Number of U.S. Muslims to Double, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2011,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-01-27-1Amuslim27_STN.htm,
[http://perma.cc/0hWmG3A8DqD].
346 Making History, First Sikh Testifies at U.S. Senate Hearing, SIKH COALITION (Sept. 20,
2012), http://www.sikhcoalition.org/advisories/2012/making-history-first-sikh-testifies-at-
us-senate-hearing, [http://pena.cc/ZL8-PBPW]; Letter from Members of Congress to
Advisory Policy Board Members (Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://crowley.house.gov/
sites/crowley. house. gov/files/Letter%20to%20APB %20on%2OHate%20Crimes
%20Against%2OSikhs%2OHindus%20and%2OArabs%2003-21-2013.pdf?
utm source= SAALT+Statement+on+FBI+Tracking&utm campaign= SAALT+Statement
+on+Senate+Immigration+Reform+Bill&utm medium=email, [http://perma.cc/
OcogLV5oWtr]; Hate Crimes and the Threat of Domestic Extremism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of Deepa lyer, Exec. Director, S. Asian Ams. Leading Together); Memorandum
from the S. Asian Ams. Leading Together to the F.B.I. Criminal Just. Info. Serys. Div.
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://saalt.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SAALT-Reccomendations-
for-Enhanced-Reporting-and-Collection-of-Hate-Crimes-to-the-Federal-Bureau-of-
Investigation.pdf?utm source= S AALT+Statement+on+FBI+Tracking&utm campaign
=SAALT+Statement+on+Senate+Immigration+Reform+Bill&utm medium= email, [http://
penna.cc/OAjF3SXtJj6].
347 HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 14 (by recommending the roles
and responsibilities associated with threat mitigation, the advisory council assumes Muslim
communities are a threat).
348 Ronald Kessler, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 97 (2002) (describing
the FBI's covert targeting of political groups); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST., The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf, [http://penna.cc/
OzJjSyHFkqH]; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., A Review of the
FBI's Investigations of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups (2010), available at
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adversarial system that rewards high volumes of investigations and
prosecutions. Including the provision of social services in the counter-
radicalization component of counterterrorism, which is de facto what
community policing will become, does not take away from its overarching
objective. Instead of de-securitizing the relationship, community policing
merely hides from plain view the counterterrorism objectives and delegates
counter-radicalization to Muslim communities.
3. Delegate Countering Violent Extremism to Muslim Communities
Some proponents of CCP acknowledge that the government will
continue its hard counterterrorism tactics irrespective of community
policing.3 49  To some extent, these proponents believe surveillance,
investigation, and prosecution are necessary components of protecting
national security.35 0 However, they take issue with the government leading
the charge on countering violent extremism programs.351 They prefer to
delegate such efforts to Muslim communities believing that Muslims can
better handle and resolve the personal crises that may lead young men to be
attracted to terrorist groups.35 2  Rather than law enforcement, Muslim
community leaders should intervene in the lives of Muslims on the so-called
path to radicalization that could lead to violence.353 These proponents
believe intervention by community leaders and family members could
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1009r.pdf, [http://perma.cc/OnLDqbBFZW1]; OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., A Review of the FB Use of National
Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006
(2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf, [http://perma.cc/
OstuYNjNqQt].
349 Beutel, supra note 30, at 17.
350 Id.
351 Michael Hirsh, Stopping Terrorism at the Source, NATIONAL JOURNAL, May 2, 2013,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/stopping-terrorism-at-the-source-20130502,
[http://pena.cc/U967-ECKH] (quoting a Los Angeles-based specialist in gang violence:
"This doesn't just come out of nowhere.... We are so damn reactive. Our communities
have to create some degree of protection. We can't just wait for the Green Berets to come
in. At the same time, there is an arrogant attitude on the part of law enforcement that 'we
have all the answers. We can do it.' There has to be a collective multidisciplinary
collaboration by the community").
352 Beutel, supra note 30 at 17 (recommending that Muslims should take the lead on
counter-radicalization because they are most qualified to do so). But see Meares & Kahan,
supra note 340, at 20-21 (describing African-American communities' support for mass
home searches in inner city neighborhoods infested with gun and gang violence).
3 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 13 (calling for Muslim community
intervention as a more effective counter-radicalization tactic).
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prevent terrorist recruitment of young men who suffer from mental health
illnesses, personal crises, or other sources of emotional vulnerability. 354
Thus, rather than ending up in jail or dying in a terrorist attack, these young
men could be rehabilitated in the early stages of their radicalization.
While seemingly reasonable, this strategy makes some
presumptions that, if false, could prove devastating to Muslim
communities' collective liberty interests. First, Muslim communities are
presumed to have the capacity and information to know when young men
are in the process of becoming terrorists. Domestic terrorism cases
involving Muslims show that very few of the defendants were integrated
within an American mosque. 355 To the contrary, most acted alone, with a
government informant or undercover agent, or with an international
source. 356 Similarly, to the extent that reports suggest increased terrorism
recruitment via the internet, 357 Muslims are not privy, nor should they be, to
the details of each other's internet activities. Indeed, many cases of
domestic terrorism both in the United States and Britain have revealed that
parents had no knowledge of their sons' alleged online criminal activities. 358
354 See, e.g., id.
1 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Documents Show Extent ofEB.I. & Role in Terror Case, N.Y
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/nyregion/fbi-had-greater-role-
in-jose-pimentel-terrorism-case-documents-show.html, [http://penna.cc/0uEkzp4Xt4j]; see
also Beutel, supra note 30, at 8 (citing cases where individuals who went on to commit or
support terrorism were not members of mosques or their congregants); Milton J. Valencia,
At Mosque, Suspect's Views Led to Ouster, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2011, available at
http://www.boston. com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/20 11/09/30/
mosque ousted ashland man charged in terrorplot/, [http://pena.cc/0uHMX2pudjQ]
("The Ashland man who allegedly plotted to fly explosive-laden, remote-controlled
airplanes into federal buildings in Washington, D.C., was asked to leave a Roxbury mosque
last year because of his radical Islamic views and suspected support of Al Qaeda, a mosque
official said yesterday.").
356 See, e.g., Mosi Secret, Man Convicted of a Terrorist Plot to Bomb Subways Is Sent to
Prison for Life, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/nyregion/
adis-medunj anin-convicted-of-subway-bomb-plot-gets-life-sentence. html?
ref=najibullahzazi, [http://penna.cc/0C2tsgz5cfB]; Goldstein, supra note 355; Brian
Ballou, Rezwan Ferdaus ofAshland sentenced to 17 years in Terror Plot; Plotted to Blow
up Pentagon, Capitol, BOSTON.COM, Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.boston.com/metrodesk/
20 12/11/0 1/re zwan-ferdaus-ashland-sentenced-y ears-terror-plot/
KKvy6D6n2PfXfbEfA4iMwJ/story.html, [http://pena.cc/0L9gFsbYbMR].
57 BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 15.
358 See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, Parents of Alleged Terrorists Seek Clues to Sons'
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Thus, absent intra-community spying, Muslim communities in the United
States know very little about individual Muslims' terrorist inclinations. If
community intervention implies self-spying, then it supports this Article's
thesis that community policing is a subordinating program.
Second, calls for community intervention overlook the serious risk
of intra-community censorship of controversial speech, expression, and
association rights of Muslims.359 Youth, leftists, or women complaining of
unjust American foreign policies, imperialism, or intra-community
inequities may find themselves silenced by gatekeepers warning them of
jeopardizing the entire Muslim community because of their troublemaking.
Consequently, pre-existing internal hierarchies along gender, racial, and
ethnic lines could be exacerbated. Through community policing,
interlocutors, most of whom are men, can further entrench their gatekeeper
status wherein Muslim communities are essentialized as one entity and
stereotyped based on a few individuals' actions. Even if those individuals
are community policing partners with strong relationships with the
government, large segments of Muslim communities, particularly youth and
women, could suffer an intra-community subordinating effect of being
voiceless and bereft of individual agency.
Third, CCP incorrectly assumes that domestic terrorists who are
Muslim are integrated into Muslim-American communities.3 60 Domestic
terrorism cases, as well as the responses of local Muslim communities,
prove otherwise.3 61 The majority of these "homegrown terrorism" cases
since 9/11 involve "lone wolf' perpetrators who fall into one of three
categories.3 62 The first is young, vulnerable men with mental health or
359 Kundnani, supra note 79, at 11 (highlighting the pressures to avoid radical criticism
enforced by community interlopers).
360 See, e.g,. Harris, supra note 5, at 134, 137 (premising his argument on "if we believe
that potential terrorists lurk in our Muslim communities, we must have good
communications with them" and "the danger posed by an exceptionally tiny number of
radicalized Muslims can almost certainly come from only one source: Muslim communities
themselves"). My thesis challenges this assumption, without which, there is little
justification for community policing unless it is revamped to focus on protecting the
interests of Muslim communities. See McCants & Watts, supra note 8 (highlighting the
false assumption that American Muslims are actually susceptible to Al Qaeda's propaganda
in large numbers when in fact that has not proven to be the case).
361 McCants & Watts, supra note 8.
362 Bergen & Hoffman, supra note 334, at 5; AARONSON, supra note 190.
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financial problems upon whom paid informants prey.3 63  Often, these
informants also play leading roles in concocting and implementing the fake
terrorist plot.364 The second is foreign nationals who come to the United
States in collaboration with international terrorists and without the
assistance of American Muslim communities. 365 The third is individuals
acting alone or with a few other co-conspirators to carry out a terrorist plot
whom are ultimately caught based on predicate acts in furtherance of their
illicit plot. 366 In all three types of cases, Muslim communities in the United
States are apparently no more aware of these terrorism-related activities
than law enforcement. 367 Indeed, Muslim communities know much less than
law enforcement about these cases because, unlike community members,
law enforcement has information drawn from extensive surveillance
networks and intelligence databases at the local, state, and federal level. 368
Thus, one is hard-pressed to determine what added value Muslim
363 Naomi Wolf, The Spectacle of Terror and its Vested Interests, GUARDIAN, May 9, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commnentisfree/cifamerica/2012/may/09/spectacle-terror-vested-
interests, [http://penna.cc/0Nucg6zMV9J] (giving examples of NYPD and FBI coercing
and paying mentally ill or slow individuals in supposed homegrown terrorist plots);
Associated Press, supra note 190.
364 Harris, supra note 5, at 130, 181 (acknowledging government's use of overly aggressive
and possibly unfair tactics to pursue individuals who seem to pose no real threat); CTR. ON
LAW & SEC., supra note 13, at 26 (reporting that since 9/11, ten defendants have formally
presented entrapment defenses and all were unsuccessful); Annie Sweeney, Chicago Terror
Case Sparks Debate About Undercover Stings, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2013, http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-01/news/ct-met-terror-entrap-20130601 1 terror-
case-sami-samir-hassoun-fbi-agents, [http://pena.cc/OiTcJ4oM77H] (reporting on one
young adult arrested after planting what he believed to be a bomb, all under the guidance
and encouragement of an informant).
365 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Christmas Day Bomb Plot Detailed in Court Filings, N.Y
TiMEs, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/us/underwear-
bomb-plot-detailed-in-court-filings.html, [http://penna.cc/OdxzRDntZFV].
366 Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80 at 307 (discussing the type of "homegrown
terrorists" that are inspired by but have no direct ties to Al Qaeda and operate alone).
367 See, e.g., Dan Browning & Allie Shah, Minneapolis Man Found Guilty ofAiding Somali
Terrorist Group, STAR TRIB., Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/
174834731.html?refer-y, [http://penna.cc/OAuGcXUafYT]; Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson,
supra note 80, at 312; Hirsch, supra note 5 (quoting a Washington business man's
observation that "[t]hey just talk about spiritual things. Most of the imams in these
mosques come from Pakistan, India, Somalia . . . . They all need education, these imams.
They just do the prayers. They don't know about the social problems in their mosques").
368 See Ashar, supra note 15, at 1195 (noting that right after 9/11 the DOJ co-opted local
law enforcement to assist in race-based questioning, arrest, and detention in immigration);
Kelly, supra note 288, at 558 (praising the PATRIOT Act's decreasing barriers between
criminal and counterterrorism investigations allowing more information sharing across
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies); Beutel, supra note 30, at 8
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communities can contribute other than assisting law enforcement in
gathering more intelligence on innocent Muslim communities.3 69
Without information about specific terrorist activity, law
enforcement stands to benefit little from CCP, unless its objectives are
really about mass surveillance of Muslim communities based on a
presumption of collective guilt.370 One alternative explanation for the rise of
such programs may be that CCP, as its supporters claim, is about
empowering Muslim communities to defend their civil rights, integrate into
American society, and access government social services. But the veracity
of that claim can be easily measured through an assessment of services
provided and policies reformed to protect civil liberties. Although beyond
the scope of this Article, a preliminary review of community assessments of
government engagement highlights the failure to produce substantive policy
changes, especially at the systemic level. 371
Finally, Muslim participants believe their intervention will stop the
government's adversarial approach because their cooperation will give them
political capital to persuade government that such harsh tactics are neither
necessary nor effective. The reality remains that prosecutors face significant
political pressure to combat terrorism by indicting, prosecuting, and
convicting more, rather than fewer, defendants as part of a prosecution-
(highlighting that extremist ideologues like Abu Hamza and shoe bomber Richard Reid
were removed or voluntarily left mosques because their fringe views were not accepted
among congregants); Glenn Greenwald, Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible
to the US Government?, GUARDIAN, May 4, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/20 13/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston, [http://perma.cc/
OJzyJpcT37b].
369 Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., to Rep. John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 38-40 (May 13, 2003)
(admitting that the new surveillance and infiltration of mosques has not produced
information relating to potential terrorism or criminal activity).
370 See, e.g., Kundnani, supra note 79; Arun Kundnani, The Wrong Way to Prevent
Homegrown Terrorism, CNN.COM, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/
12/16/kundnani.prevent.muslim/, [www.perma.cc/0HvRhYNSABS] (critiquing Britain's
counter-radicalization program, also known as Prevent, as being used to establish one of
the most elaborate systems of surveillance ever seen in Britain); Innes, supra note 117, at
231 ("building a network of community intelligence contacts provides a comparatively
effective way of maintaining surveillance over groups and communities" that are especially
hard to penetrate).
3' Carpenter, Levitt & Jacobson, supra note 80, at 305. In a forthcoming paper, I will delve
into more detail on how to measure and hold the government accountable for keeping its
promises that community policing serves the interests of Muslim communities.
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driven counterterrorism regime, making Muslim participants' expectations
unreasonable.3 72 Indeed, when the Seattle Christmas tree bomber's father
solicited the assistance of the FBI because of his concerns about his son's
mental health problems, the FBI initiated a sting operation through the use
of an informant that led to his son's prosecution for terrorism.3 73 Law
enforcement did not respond by seeking mental health intervention. In the
end, CCP will not change the deeply entrenched adversarial system.
Moreover, unlike local police who are accountable directly to local
communities, federal agencies have little incentive to change their tactics to
avoid alienating Muslim communities. For them, it is rational to anger
politically powerless communities in exchange for retaining popularity
among the majority of Americans who believe Muslims are inherently
prone to terrorism, disloyal, and warrant suspicion3 74 Community policing
merely serves structural incentives to be "hard on terrorism" by providing
more opportunities to gather intelligence for the purpose of investigating
and prosecuting more Muslims. 3 75
Thus, good faith community intervention does not necessarily
protect targeted Muslims (usually young males) from prosecution. To the
contrary, prosecutors are likely to exploit their relationships with Muslim
community leaders to ask them to persuade their communities that the
indictment was necessary based on classified information unavailable to
them; that they should trust the prosecutor's judgment and promises that the
decision was not an abuse of discretion; and that the prosecution is not
indicative of a larger assault on Muslim communities.
372 Ten Years After 9/11 Hearings, supra note 19.
3 Bryan Denson, Portland Terrorism Trial: FBI Agents Trace Trail that Led them to
Mohamed Mohamud, OREGONIAN, Jan. 23, 2013, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2013/0 1/portland terrorism trial fbi a.html, [http://
www.penna.cc/OJuGD85U2bo].
374 Setty, supra note 5, at 187, passim (arguing that interest convergence must exist in terms
of political will to enable Congress and the President to support rights-protective
limitations on national security policies); RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 31-51
(2007) (using a cost-benefit analysis to argue in favor of violating civil liberties of Muslims
to protect the American majority).
75 Press Release, ACLU, FOI Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence
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4. Incrementally Reform Counterterrorism Policies through Relationship
Empowering the community to reform counterterrorism policies
and practices incrementally is another commonly invoked justification for
community policing. 376 Implicit in this argument is an admission that
sweeping, structural changes in counterterrorism strategy are improbable.
The politics of terrorism in America, coupled with entrenched bureaucratic
interests in the vast counterterrorism budgets, nearly guarantee
counterterrorism's prioritization in the national strategy. 377  Muslim
communities, therefore, are left to focus on incremental reforms that, over
the long run, may produce the benefits of structural changes. Proponents of
this reasoning are pragmatists willing to accept the "less bad" option of
community policing, with all of the attendant risks, rather than boycotting
any engagement with the government. 378  To them, the latter nearly
guarantees a perpetuation of the harshest tactics, leaving Muslim
communities further disempowered. 379  Thus, responsible community
leaders have an obligation to support community policing with the purpose
of incrementally reforming either the most egregious practices or those that
the government is most willing to reform.
When criticized as naive or unduly optimistic, these proponents of
CCP point to small victories that have cumulatively improved the civil
liberties of Muslims in America. For example, after intensive lobbying at
federal civil rights engagement meetings, Muslim and Sikh communities
were able to amend DHS's screening process as it relates to religiously
376 Innes, supra note 117, at 233; Salam Al-Maryati, The Wrong Way to Fight Terrorism,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/19/opinion/la-oe-
almarayati-fbi-20111019, [http://www.pena.cc/09LfraAaNna] (defending his twenty years
of engagement with the U.S. government as a Muslim leader).
77 See, e.g., Ten Years After 911 Hearings, supra note 19 (testifying that a threat-based,
intelligence led approach has "transformed the Bureau into a national security organization
that fuses traditional law enforcement and intelligence missions").
378 See Written Testimony of Asim Rehman, Federal Civil Rights Engagement with Arab
and Muslim American Communities Post 9/11, U.S. Comm'n on Civ. Rts. (Nov. 9, 2012),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/calendar/tmscrpt/TranscriptFinal_8-2-13.pdf, [http://
www.perma.cc/OhErnMvjoe4/]; Working with Communities Hearing, supra note 26
(statement of Mohamed Elibiary, The Freedom and Justice Foundation co-founder).
379 See Working with Communities Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Mohamed
Elibiary, The Freedom and Justice Foundation co-founder).
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mandated headwear.38 0 No longer do Muslim women or Sikh men donning
headscarves or turbans, respectively, have to remove their headwear in
public when selected for secondary screening.381 They now have the option
of being screened in a private room.38 2 Moreover, removing the headwear is
the option of last resort for TSA screeners after they allow the traveler to
self-frisk their heads and then have their hands tested for explosive
materials.383 However, such marginal reforms do not protect travelers from
being selected for secondary screening based on their perceived Muslim
identity. Admittedly, this became a moot issue upon DHS's adoption of
body scanners through which all travelers must pass, leaving all Americans
with diminished privacy.38 4
Another oft-celebrated-but minimal-reform is the suspension of
NSEERs ("National Security Entry-Exit Registration System"), a program
that required all non-citizen males between the ages of fifteen and forty-five
from Muslim-majority countries to register with the government and follow
burdensome administrative procedures or face deportation. 385 NSEERs was
passed shortly after 9/11, and it sent the most explicit message to the public,
and Muslim communities in particular, that the government was closely
tracking Muslim men in the United States as part of its aggressive
preventive counterterrorism strategy.386 After more than ten years of civil
rights advocacy directed at DHS, Department of Justice, and the White
House, a coalition of Arab, Muslim, and civil rights and liberties
380 TSA Changes Head Covering Screening Procedure in Response to Concerns of




382 See, e.g., Religious and Cultural Needs, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-infonnation/
religious-and-cultural-needs, [http://penna.cc/7JXH-XHHY].
383 See id.
384 But see Mike Ahlers, TSA Removing 'Virtual Strip Search'Body Scanners, CNN, Jan.
19, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/18/travel/tsa-body-scanners, [http://www.pena.cc/
OpcmoBaXda6/] (removing body scanners because manufacturers could not meet a
congressional-ordered deadline to install privacy software on the machines).
385 The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear and Secrecy, RTS. WORKING
GRP. (2012), available at http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/
RWGPenn NSEERSReport 060412.pdf; NSEERS: The Consequences ofAmerica k Efforts
to Secure Its Borders, AM. ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. (2009), available at http://
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2694, [http://penna.cc/R9CS-3 CAL].
386 The NSEERS Effect: A Decade ofRacial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy, supra note 385, at
4.
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organizations declared victory in the suspension-though not the complete
elimination-of the NSEERs program.38 7 Notwithstanding the protracted
time frame for eliminating a clearly discriminatory program, the
government admitted that its basis for suspending the program was not
concern for Muslims' civil liberties but rather its ability to obtain the same
information through other means.388 What appeared to be a testament to
community engagement with the government was really a reflection of
advancements in technology employed by DHS in immigration
enforcement.389 Hence the underlying discriminatory motive of NSEERs
may still exist but is executed through less visible means.
Creation of the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program ("TRIP") within
DHS is also considered a triumph of community engagement and advocacy
with federal agencies.39 0 TRIP is tasked with receiving and resolving
traveler complaints of misidentification or erroneous inclusion on terrorist
watch lists and No Fly lists. 391 The program was created to relieve DHS's
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, which at the time had minimal
complaint adjudication capacity, from resolving the thousands of complaints
387 See, e.g., Chris Rickerd, Homeland Security Suspends Ineffective, Discriminatory
Immigration Program, ACLU BLOG OF RTS (May 6, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog/
immigrants-rights-racial-justice/homeland-security-suspends-ineffective-discriminatory,
[http://www.perma.cc/02tS7k9bhDx].
388 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., Removing Designated Countries From the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 76 Fed. Reg. 82, 23830 (Apr. 28, 2011)
("Over the past six years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented
several new automated systems that capture arrival and exit information on nonimmigrant
travelers to the United States, and DHS has determined that recapturing this data manually
when a nonimmigrant is seeking admission to the United States is redundant and no longer
provides any increase in security."); see also Rickerd, supra note 387 ("DHS's suspension
of the NSEERS program didn't even merit a posting on DHS's website, much less a plan to
communicate to those hanned by NSEERS. Tellingly, DHS justified NSSERS' suspension
only on efficiency grounds . . . and completely glossed over the program's civil liberties
costs.").
389 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 388.
390 E.g., ADC Welcomes New TSA Aviation Security and Traveler Screening Enhancements,
ARAB AMERICA, http://www.arabamerica.com/michigan/california/news.php?id=103,
[http://www.perma.cc/OQkvyzGa2bL/].
391 See, e.g., Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act:
Stopping Terrorist Travel: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Aff., 111th Cong. (2009) , available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
the-terrorist-screening-center-and-its-role-in-combating-terrorist-travel, [http://
www.pena.cc/Ogd6USHuhC2/] (statement of Timothy Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening
Center, FBI) (stating "only 0.7 percent of the DHS TRIP complaints actually have some
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by aggrieved travelers, most of whom were Muslim. 392 But soon after its
inception, TRIP became notorious for its late responses, which sometimes
came years after a complaint was filed, and for the absence of due process
for complainants to meaningfully challenge their inclusion on a list.393
Moreover, TRIP's opaque and terse responses, known as Glomar
responses, 394 wherein the government refuses either to confirm or deny the
existence of a violation, left complainants convinced that the complaint
process was a fagade that allowed the government to claim it safeguarded
civil liberties without permitting meaningful challenge. 395 The government
has all of the information while the traveler is kept in the dark throughout
the redress process. 396 Six years after its inception, TRIP is still encumbered
with a high volume of complaints, is short of staff, and has little power to
affect the front end of the watch listing process to decrease the number of
false positives or misidentification. 397
Other proclaimed victories involve individual civil rights violations
by private actors. While significant to Muslims' collective rights interests,
connection to the Terrorist Watchlist. Of the 0.7 percent that have a connection to the
watchlist, approximately 51 percent are appropriately watchlisted, 22 percent have been
modified or reviewed prior to redress, 10 percent were similar names, and 15 percent were
removed or downgraded due to the redress process"); Amy Pavuk, supra note 185
(describing Muslim man harassed over lengthy period of time when traveling because on
watch list).
392 Letter from Marcia Hoffman to Electronic Frontier Foundation, TRIP Complaint
Statistics (Jan. 21, 2010), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/
tripcomplaints/20100121 tripcomplaints.pdf (reporting over 66,000 complaints between
Feb. 20, 2007 and Aug. 6, 2009); ANNY P. BAKALIAN & MEHDI BOZORGMEHR, BACKLASH
9/11: MIDDLE EASTERN AND MUSLIM AMERICANS RESPOND 183 (2009).
393 See, e.g., Problem-Filled Traveler Redress Program Won't Fly, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO.
CTR. (Nov. 2006), http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1106/default.html, [http://
www.perma.cc/OoXWRgsTRRz/]. But see Letter from Marcia Hoffman to Electronic
Frontier Foundation, supra note 392 (reporting that from 2007-2009, 54% of complaints
were resolved in less than ninety days, 15% in ninety-one to 180 days, 15% in 181 to 360
days, and 15% in more than one year).
394 Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillipi v. CIA, 546 F.2d
1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
395 DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY TRAVELER REDRESS INQUIRY PROGRAM 89-90 (Sept. 2009), available at http://
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG-09-103r Sep09.pdf; Stellin, supra note 186.
396 DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 395, at 89.
397 Problem-Filled Traveler Redress Program Won 't Fly, supra note 393; DEPT. OF
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these cases are handled by federal offices with an exclusively civil rights
enforcement agenda such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of
Justice.398 Institutional and political incentives directly contribute to their
proactive enforcement of individual civil rights violations that are
symptoms of the preventive counterterrorism strategy. Notably, these offices
lack the legal authority to hold accountable other federal offices alleged to
have violated Muslims' civil liberties.399 These small successes, while
important for the individual victim, do not cure the systemic subordination
effect, and thus should not be mistaken for systemic policy reforms
necessary to protect Muslim communities' interests.
IV. Conclusion
As this Article demonstrates, community policing in
counterterrorism is fraught with adverse consequences that may be
overlooked by Muslim proponents and local law enforcement. CCP's
implementation occurs within a broader federal counterterrorism strategy
that subordinates Muslim communities in various ways. Specifically,
current counterterrorism strategy, among other things, selectively targets
Muslims notwithstanding the rise of non-Muslim right wing groups that
engage in violence; criminalizes humanitarian aid to conflict zones in
Muslim-majority countries; 400  conflates political dissent and orthodox
Islamic practices with unlawful terrorism; profiles Muslims in travel
screening and terrorist watch listing; and targets impressionable young
Muslim men with mental health problems for sting operations where
informants play a leading role.
398 See, e.g., Press Release, EEOC, Court Finds for EEOC in Religious Discrimination Suit
Against Abercrombie and Fitch (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/7-15-1la.cfm, [http://www.perma.cc/OKCAFAtJi9c/]; Initiative to
Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash, Enforcement and Outreach, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php, [http://penna.cc/8S7X-
WYAY].
399 Authority & Role, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/, [http://www.penna.cc/
OdCwkzzizf5/]; About the Division, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/,
[http://www.penna.cc/09XVomf2pi/].
400 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); KATE MACKINTOSH & PATRICK
DUPLAT, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF DONOR COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES ON
PRINCIPLED HUMANITARIAN ACTION 40-47 (2013), available at http://www.nrc.no/arch/
img/9680215.pdf.
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Unlike community policing employed in inner city communities
and developed in response to ineffective paramilitary policing models, CCP
keeps intact the preventive counterterrorism paradigm that adopts the
military counterinsurgency tactics of counter-radicalization and domestic
criminal justice priorities of surveillance, investigation, and prosecution. In
contrast to traditional community policing where citizens seek the
protection of local law enforcement from third-party drug dealers,
gangsters, and other criminal elements, Muslim communities engage with
federal law enforcement to dissuade them from violating their collective
rights. And as they beseech their government to respect their civil liberties,
Muslims must also seek the protection of law enforcement against private
acts of violence and discrimination. 40 1 For many Muslims, the government
may come across as more foe than friend. 402
Thus, CCP as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of
empowerment and mutual trust and is merely another tool in the federal
government's toolkit that perpetuates the "Terrorist Other" stereotype. 403
Without systemic reforms of the underlying strategy and overreaching
tactics, community policing will merely co-opt Muslim communities and
local law enforcement into a highly flawed counterterrorism regime to the
detriment of their otherwise good relations. 40 4
While community policing programs could in theory benefit
Muslim communities' collective interests, as described in the counter-
critiques in Part III.B above, CCP's predecessor programs prove that in
practice the results are likely to be otherwise. Community engagement and
outreach programs have only left Muslim communities frustrated with the
government's inability or refusal to adopt a systemic approach to resolving
civil liberties grievances. Grievances are addressed, if at all, on an
individual level, making the process analogous to scooping water out of an
ocean with a spoon. Even if an individual complaint is resolved, there are
401 Hussain, supra note 15, at 934; Ashar, supra note 15, at 1189.
402 See EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17; STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EMPOWERING
LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 4; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., supra note 17, at 10; Chinese &
Weichselbaum, supra note 17.
403 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 6, at 436; see also Alibeli & Yaghi, supra note 6
(discussing the scapegoating of American Muslims). See Volpp, supra note 6, passim for a
discussion of the post-9/11 othering of persons who appear to be of Arab descent as
terrorists.
404 See PRICE, supra note 5, at 39-40.
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hundreds more arising from policies and practices that are fundamentally
rights-infringing and selectively enforced. Meanwhile, community
attendees have discovered that some, and possibly all, FBI outreach
meetings are used to gather intelligence on Muslim communities, which is
then input into intelligence databases accessible across local, state, and
federal agencies.
Rather than focus on how to co-opt Muslim communities into
existing paradigms, the efforts of local law enforcement and communities
are better spent shifting the paradigm away from the use of religious
affiliation and ethnic origin as indicia of terrorism to focusing on
individualized suspicion based on predicate acts of criminal activity and an
assumption of the innocence of Muslim communities. For that to happen,
the federal law enforcement agencies must undergo the same monumental
cultural and political changes as local police departments did in the 1990s in
order to make traditional community policing a relative success. Until then,
community policing should be rejected by both local law enforcement and
Muslim communities alike.
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